1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910820341703321

Titolo

Institutions and incentives in regulatory science / / edited by Jason Scott Johnston

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Lanham, Md., : Lexington Books, 2012

ISBN

1-280-66651-X

9786613643445

0-7391-6947-5

Edizione

[1st ed.]

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (233 p.)

Altri autori (Persone)

JohnstonJason Scott

Disciplina

363.7/05610973

Soggetti

Environmental policy - United States

Environmental agencies - United States

Environmental protection - Standards - United States

Environmental law - United States

Environmental sciences - Political aspects - United States

Science and state - United States

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Description based upon print version of record.

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Nota di contenuto

Introduction / Jason Scott Johnston -- The cost of cartelization : the ipcc process and the crisis of credibility in climate science / Jason Scott Johnston -- Adversarial versus consensus processes for assessing scientific evidence : should the IPCC operate more like a courtroom? / Ross McKitrick -- On the origin of specious species / Rob Roy Ramey II -- Politics and science in endangered species / Katrina Miriam Wyman -- Reconciling the scientific & regulatory timetables / James W. Conrad, Jr -- Improving the use of science to inform environmental regulation / Susan E. Dudley and George M. Gray -- A return to expertise? : a proposal for an institute of scientific assessments / Gary E. Marchant.

Sommario/riassunto

Institutions and Incentives in Regulatory Science explores fundamental problems with regulatory science in the environmental and natural resource law field. Each chapter covers a variety of natural resource and regulatory areas, ranging from climate change to endangered species protection and traditional health-based environmental regulation. The contributors in this volume address how institutions for regulatory



science should be designed in light of the inevitable misfit between the political or legal demand for regulatory action an