1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910820223103321

Titolo

The mathematics of decisions, elections, and games / / Karl-Dieter Crisman, Michael A. Jones, editors

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Providence, Rhode Island : , : American Mathematical Society, , 2014

©2014

ISBN

1-4704-1930-0

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (229 p.)

Collana

Contemporary Mathematics, , 1098-3627 ; ; 624

Classificazione

91-0691A0591A1291A2091B0691B0891B1291B1491B3291F10

Disciplina

519.3

Soggetti

Game theory

Statistical decision

Probabilities

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

"AMS Special Sessions on The Mathematics of Decisions, Elections, and Games, January 4, 2012, Boston, MA, Janaury 11-12, 2013, San Diego, CA."--Cover.

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references at the end of each chapters.

Nota di contenuto

""Preface""; ""Redistricting and district compactness""; ""1. Introduction: Redistricting and Gerrymandering""; ""2. Measuring Compactness""; ""3. Criteria for Compactness Measures and Discussion""; ""References""; ""Fair division and redistricting""; ""1. Introduction""; ""2. Fair Division""; ""3. Redistricting: the problem of partisan unfairness""; ""4. What is a party�s fair share?""; ""5. The ranking protocol""; ""6. The fair division redistricting protocol""; ""7. Conclusion""; ""References""; ""When does approval voting make the “right choices�?""; ""1. Introduction""

""2. Judging Multiple Proposals""""3. State Dependence""; ""4. Proposal Dependence""; ""5. Other Kinds of Dependence""; ""6. Follow-the-Leader""; ""7. Applications to Politics""; ""8. Relationship to the Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT)""; ""9. Conclusions""; ""References""; ""How indeterminate is sequential majority voting? A judgement aggregation perspective""; ""1. Introduction""; ""2. Preliminaries""; ""3. Global indeterminacy""; ""4. Full indeterminacy""; ""5. Generalized Antichains""; ""6. Condorcet entropy and almost full indeterminacy""; ""Conclusion""; ""Appendix: Proofs""

""References""""Weighted voting, threshold functions, and zonotopes""; ""1. Introduction""; ""2. Hyperplane arrangements and zonotopes""; ""3.



The derived zonotope""; ""4. Conclusions and future work""; ""5. Acknowledgments""; ""References""; ""The Borda Count, the Kemeny Rule, and the Permutahedron""; ""1. Introduction""; ""2. Social Choice and Symmetry""; ""3. Decompositions and Voting""; ""4. Representations""; ""5. Theorems and the Borda-Kemeny Spectrum""; ""6. Looking Forward""; ""7. Appendix""; ""References""; ""Double-interval societies""; ""1. Introduction""

""2. Double-   String Societies""""3. Asymptotic approval ratios for double-   string societies""; ""4. A double-interval society lower bound""; ""5. Modifying double-   string societies""; ""6. Conclusion and Open Questions""; ""References""; ""Voting for committees in agreeable societies""; ""1. Introduction""; ""2. Definitions""; ""3. Votes Within a Ball""; ""4. Concentric Voter Distributions""; ""5. Main Theorem""; ""6. Extensions""; ""References""; ""Selecting diverse committees with candidates from multiple categories""; ""1. Introduction""; ""2. Basic framework""

""4. A Dynamic Approach to Solving the Bankruptcy Problem""