Theories of scientific method : an introduction / / Robert Nola and Howard Sankey

• Record Nr.: UNINA9910819780103321
• Autore: Nola Robert
• Pubbl/distr/stampa: London ; ; New York : , : Routledge, , 2014
• ISBN: 1-317-49348-6; 1-317-49349-4; 1-315-71195-8; 1-282-94336-7; 9786612943362; 1-84465-388-9
• Edizione: [1st ed.]
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (x, 381 pages) : digital, PDF file(s)
• Collana: Philosophy and science
• Altri autori (Persone): SankeyHoward
• Disciplina: 501
• Soggetti: Science - Methodology
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Note generali: First published in 2007 by Acumen.
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references and index.
• Nota di contenuto: Cover; Half Title; Title; Copyright; Contents; Abbreviations; Acknowledgements; Introduction; I The idea of methodology; 1 What is this thing called scientific method?; 1.1 Different methodological practices within the sciences; 1.2 Methodology and clinical trials; 1.3 Methodology within the context of discovery and the context of justification; 1.4 Methods for discovery; 1.5 Heuristics as methodology; 1.6 Scientific method and the methodology of logic; 2 Theoretical values in science; 2.1 Aims of science and scientists; 2.2 A broad classification of kinds of value; 2.3 Some virtues of scientific theories2.4 Kuhn on values; 2.5 Aims and values of science: Popper; 2.6 Aims and values of science: Duhem; 2.7 Epistemic and pragmatic values; 3 Rules and principles of method; 3.1 Values, rules and principles of method; 3.2 Some features of principles of method; 3.3 Methodological principles from the history of science, I: Descartes; 3.4 Methodological principles from the history of science, II: Newton; 3.5 Methodological principles from the history of science, III: Duhem; 4 Metamethodology; 4.1 A three-tiered relationship between science, methods and ; metamethods4.2 Metamethodology: what is it and is it possible?; 4.3 A priori, empirical and expressivist approaches to metamethodology; 4.4 The metamethodology of reflective equilibrium; 4.5 The historical turn, methods and metamethods; II Inductive and hypothetico-deductive methods; 5 Induction in science; 5.1 Deduction and induction; 5.2 From induction to probability and confirmation; 5.3 Enumerative induction; 5.4 The rule of inference to the best explanation; 5.5 The problem of grue; 5.6 Simplicity of equations; 5.7 Simplicity and curve-fitting6 Some justifications of induction; 6.1 Attempting a justification of deduction; 6.2 A sceptical argument against the justification of induction; 6.3 The inductivist justification of induction; 6.4 The pragmatic vindication of induction; 6.5 Externalism and the warrant for induction; 7 The hypothetico-deductive method; 7.1 The structure of the H-D method; 7.2 Refinements of, and problems for, the H-D method; 7.3 Problems for H-D confirmation; 7.4 Appendix on some paradoxical results of confirmation theory; III Probability and scientific method; 8 Probability, Bayesianism and methodology8.1 Principles and theorems of probability; 8.2 Bayes's theorem in some of its forms; 8.3 Bayesian confirmation; 8.4 The H-D method in a Bayesian context; 8.5 Subjective degree of belief as a probability; 8.6 Metamethodological justification and the Dutch book theorem; 8.7 Bayesian conditionalization and pure subjective Bayesianism; 9 Bayesianism: applications and problems; 9.1 The problem of priors; 9.2 Is Bayesianism complete?; 9.3 New evidence and the problem of old evidence; 9.4 Kuhnian values and Bayesianism; 9.5 Bayesianism and inference to the best explanation
• Sommario/riassunto: What is it to be scientific? Is there such a thing as scientific method? And if so, how might such methods be justified? Robert Nola and Howard Sankey seek to provide answers to these fundamental questions in their exploration of the major recent theories of scientific method. Although for many scientists their understanding of method is something they just “pick up”; in the course of being trained, Nola and Sankey argue that it is possible to be explicit about what this tacit understanding of method is, rather than leave it as some unfathomable mystery. They robustly defend the idea that there is such a thing as scientific method and show how this might be legitimated. The book begins with the question of what methodology might mean and explores the notions of values, rules and principles, before investigating how methodologists have sought to show that our scientific methods are rational. Part 2 of the book sets out some principles of inductive method and examines its alternatives including abduction, IBE, and hypothetico-deductivism. Part 3 introduces probabilistic modes of reasoning, particularly Bayesianism in its various guises, and shows how it is able to give an account of many of the values and rules of method. Part 4 considers the ideas of philosophers who have proposed distinctive theories of method such as Popper, Lakatos, Kuhn and Feyerabend and Part 5 continues this theme by considering philosophers who have proposed “naturalised”; theories of method such as Quine, Laudan and Rescher. The book offers readers a comprehensive introduction to the idea of scientific method and a wide-ranging discussion of how historians of science, philosophers of science and scientists have grappled with the question over the last fifty years.