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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910818634803321 |
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Autore |
Gennaro Rocco J |
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Titolo |
Consciousness and self-consciousness : a defense of the higher-order thought theory of consciousness / / Rocco J. Gennaro |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Amsterdam ; ; Philadelphia, : John Benjamins Pub., c1996 |
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ISBN |
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1-282-16392-2 |
9786612163920 |
90-272-9984-6 |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (232 p.) |
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Collana |
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Advances in consciousness research, , 1381-589X ; ; v. 6 |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Consciousness |
Self-consciousness (Sensitivity) |
Thought and thinking |
Phenomenological psychology |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Description based upon print version of record. |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references (p. [207]-215) and indexes. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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CONSCIOUSNESS AND SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS; Editorial page; Title page; LCC data; Acknowledgements; Contents; CHAPTER 1. Introduction and Terminology; CHAPTER 2. A Theory of State Consciousness; CHAPTER 3. Why the Conscious Making State must be a Thought; CHAPTER 4. Objections and Replies; CHAPTER 5. Does Mentality Require Consciousness?; CHAPTER 6. Phenomenal States; CHAPTER 7. The Behavior Argument; CHAPTER 8. The De Se Argument; CHAPTER 9. The Memory Argument; Notes; References; Index of Topics; Index of Names; the series ADVANCES IN CONSCIOUSNESS RESEARCH (AiCR) |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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This interdisciplinary work contains the most sustained attempt at developing and defending one of the few genuine theories of consciousness. Following the lead of David Rosenthal, the author argues for the so-called 'higher-order thought theory of consciousness'. This theory holds that what makes a mental state conscious is the presence of a suitable higher-order thought directed at the mental state. In addition, the somewhat controversial claim that "consciousness entails self-consciousness" is vigorously defended. The approach is mostly 'analytic' in style and draws on important recent |
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