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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910818370603321 |
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Autore |
Muolo Paul |
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Titolo |
Chain of blame [[electronic resource] ] : how Wall Street caused the mortgage and credit crisis / / Paul Muolo, Mathew Padilla |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Hoboken, N.J., : John Wiley & Sons, c2008 |
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ISBN |
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1-118-03958-0 |
1-281-74428-X |
9786611744281 |
0-470-40988-6 |
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Edizione |
[1st ed.] |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (354 p.) |
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Altri autori (Persone) |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Mortgages - United States |
Mortgage loans - United States |
Financial crises - United States |
Stock exchanges - United States |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Description based upon print version of record. |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references (p. 309-317) and index. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Chain of Blame: How Wall Street Caused the Mortgage and Credit Crisis; Contents; Acknowledgments; Introduction; Cast of Characters; Chapter 1: Angelo Speaks, the Worldwide Contagion Begins; Chapter 2: The Repo Man Meets the Bald Granny; Chapter 3: The Death of the Bailey Building and Loan, the Rise of Millionaire Loan Brokers and Countrywide; Chapter 4: The Beach Boys of B&C; Chapter 5: Angelo Rising; Chapter 6: The Holy Roller of REITs; Chapter 7: The End of the (New) Century; Chapter 8: A Conspiracy by Merrill?; Chapter 9: A Warning from Lewie; Chapter 10: Deep in the Belly of the Bear |
Chapter 11: Armageddon TimesChapter 12: What the Hell Happened?; Chapter 13: We Buried (Some of) Our Garbage Overseas; Source and Interview Notes; Glossary; About the Authors; Index; |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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In the summer of 2007, the subprime empire that Wall Street had built all came crashing down. Banks like Countrywide and non-banks such as New Century Financial--all financed by Bear Stearns, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers and others--were in danger of closing, or actually failing. On average, 50 lenders a month were going |
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