1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910818214203321

Autore

Norris Pippa

Titolo

Electoral engineering : voting rules and political behavior / / Pippa Norris

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Cambridge, UK ; ; New York, : Cambridge University Press, 2004

ISBN

1-107-14799-9

1-280-44931-4

0-511-79098-8

0-511-18568-5

0-511-18485-9

0-511-18752-1

0-511-31361-6

0-511-18659-2

Edizione

[1st ed.]

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (xi, 375 pages) : digital, PDF file(s)

Disciplina

324.6/3

Soggetti

Elections

Voting

Party affiliation

Representative government and representation

Comparative government

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references (p. 265-345) and index.

Nota di contenuto

Cover; Half-title; Title; Copyright; Contents; List of Tables and Figures; Preface; PART I INTRODUCTION; PART II THE CONSEQUENCES FOR VOTING BEHAVIOR; PART III THE CONSEQUENCES FOR POLITICAL REPRESENTATION; PART IV CONCLUSIONS; Bibliography; Notes; Index

Sommario/riassunto

From Kosovo to Kabul, the last decade witnessed growing interest in ?electoral engineering?. Reformers have sought to achieve either greater government accountability through majoritarian arrangements or wider parliamentary diversity through proportional formula. Underlying the normative debates are important claims about the impact and consequences of electoral reform for political representation and voting behavior. The study compares and evaluates two broad schools of



thought, each offering contracting expectations. One popular approach claims that formal rules define electoral incentives facing parties, politicians and citizens. By changing these rules, rational choice institutionalism claims that we have the capacity to shape political behavior. Alternative cultural modernization theories differ in their emphasis on the primary motors driving human behavior, their expectations about the pace of change, and also their assumptions about the ability of formal institutional rules to alter, rather than adapt to, deeply embedded and habitual social norms and patterns of human behavior.