1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910815802003321

Autore

Chouraqui Frank

Titolo

Ambiguity and the absolute : Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty on the question of truth / / Frank Chouraqui

Pubbl/distr/stampa

New York : , : Fordham University Press, , 2014

ISBN

0-8232-5414-3

0-8232-6111-5

0-8232-5413-5

0-8232-5412-7

Edizione

[First edition.]

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (xviii, 304 pages)

Collana

Perspectives in Continental Philosophy

Perspectives in continental philosophy

Disciplina

121

Soggetti

Absolute, The

Ambiguity

Truth

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Nota di contenuto

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Abbreviations -- Preface -- Introduction -- 1 Nietzsche on Self-Differentiation and Genealogy -- 2 The Incorporation of Truth and the Symbiosis of Truth and Life -- 3 The Self-Becoming of the World and the Incompleteness of Being -- Transition: Vicious Circles, Virtuous Circles, and Meeting Merleau-Ponty in the Middle -- 4 The Origin of Truth -- 5 Existential Reduction and the Object of Truth -- 6 Merleau-Ponty’s “Soft” Ontology of Truth as Falsification -- Conclusion -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index

Sommario/riassunto

Friedrich Nietzsche and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Chouraqui argues, are linked by how they conceive the question of truth. Although both thinkers criticize the traditional concept of truth as objectivity, they both find that rejecting it does not solve the problem. What is it in our natural existence that gave rise to the notion of truth?The answer to that question is threefold. First, Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty both propose a genealogy of “truth” in which to exist means to make implicit truth claims. Second, both seek to recover the preobjective ground from which truth as an erroneous concept arose. Finally, this attempt at



recovery leads both thinkers to ontological considerations regarding how we must conceive of a being whose structure allows for the existence of the belief in truth. In conclusion, Chouraqui suggests that both thinkers’ investigations of the question of truth lead them to conceive of being as the process of self-falsification by which indeterminate being presents itself as determinate.