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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910815571303321 |
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Autore |
Finkel Meir <1968-> |
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Titolo |
On flexibility : recovery from technological and doctrinal surprise on the battlefield / / Meir Finkel ; translated by Moshe Tlamim |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Stanford, Ca, : Stanford Security Studies, 2011 |
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ISBN |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (337 p.) |
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Altri autori (Persone) |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Military readiness |
Military doctrine |
Military art and science |
Surprise (Military science) |
Military history, Modern - 20th century |
Technology - Military aspects |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Description based upon print version of record. |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references and index. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Prediction and intelligence : the dominant approach in force planning and its failure to answer the challenge of technological and doctrinal surprise -- Conceptual and doctrinal flexibility -- Organizational and technological flexibility -- Cognitive and command and control (C2) flexibility -- The mechanism for lesson learning and rapid dissemination -- The German recovery from the surprise of British chaff -- The German recovery from the Soviet T-34 tank surprise -- The Israeli recovery from the Egyptian Sagger missile surprise -- The Israeli air force recovery from the Arab anti-aircraft missile surprise -- The slow British recovery from the German armor and anti-tank tactics -- The slow Soviet recovery from the surprise of low-intensity conflict in Afghanistan -- The French failure to recover from the surprise of the German blitzkrieg. |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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This book addresses one of the basic questions in military studies: How can armies cope effectively with technological and doctrinal surprises-ones that leave them vulnerable to new weapons systems and/or combat doctrines? Author Meir Finkel contends that the current paradigm-with its over-dependence on intelligence and an all-out |
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