Fixing the facts : national security and the politics of intelligence

• Record Nr.: UNINA9910814876603321
• Autore: Rovner Joshua
• Pubbl/distr/stampa: Ithaca, : Cornell University Press, 2011
• ISBN: 0-8014-6314-9; 0-8014-6313-0
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (275 p.)
• Collana: Cornell studies in security affairs
• Altri autori (Persone): RovnerJoshua
• Disciplina: 327.1273
• Soggetti: Intelligence service - Political aspects - United States; National security - United States; National sikkerhed; Internationale relationer; USA; United States Foreign relations 1945-1989; United States Foreign relations 1989-
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Note generali: Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references and index.
• Nota di contenuto: A basic problem : the uncertain role of intelligence in national security -- Pathologies of intelligence-policy relations -- Policy oversell and politicization -- The Johnson administration and the Vietnam estimates -- The Nixon administration and the Soviet strategic threat -- The Ford administration and the Team B affair -- Intelligence, policy, and the war in Iraq -- Politics, politicization, and the need for secrecy.
• Sommario/riassunto: What is the role of intelligence agencies in strategy and policy? How do policymakers use (or misuse) intelligence estimates? When do intelligence-policy relations work best? How do intelligence-policy failures influence threat assessment, military strategy, and foreign policy? These questions are at the heart of recent national security controversies, including the 9/11 attacks and the war in Iraq. In both cases the relationship between intelligence and policy broke down-with disastrous consequences.In Fixing the Facts, Joshua Rovner explores the complex interaction between intelligence and policy and shines a spotlight on the problem of politicization. Major episodes in the history ; of American foreign policy have been closely tied to the manipulation of intelligence estimates. Rovner describes how the Johnson administration dealt with the intelligence community during the Vietnam War; how President Nixon and President Ford politicized estimates on the Soviet Union; and how pressure from the George W. Bush administration contributed to flawed intelligence on Iraq. He also compares the U.S. case with the British experience between 1998 and 2003, and demonstrates that high-profile government inquiries in both countries were fundamentally wrong about what happened before the war.