The political geography of inequality : regions and redistribution / / Pablo Beramendi

• Record Nr.: UNINA9910814495703321
• Autore: Beramendi Pablo
• Pubbl/distr/stampa: Cambridge ; ; New York, : Cambridge University Press, 2012
• ISBN: 1-139-33419-0; 1-107-22786-0; 1-280-39394-7; 9786613571861; 1-139-33758-0; 1-139-34003-4; 1-139-34161-8; 1-139-33671-1; 1-139-33845-5; 1-139-04279-3
• Edizione: [1st ed.]
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (xvi, 295 pages) : digital, PDF file(s)
• Collana: Cambridge studies in comparative politics
• Disciplina: 320.01/1
• Soggetti: Regionalism; Equality; Comparative government; European Union countries Economic conditions Regional disparities; North America Economic conditions Regional disparities
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Note generali: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references and index.
• Nota di contenuto: List of tables -- List of figures -- Acknowledgments -- Regions and redistributions: introduction and overview -- A theory of fiscal structures in political unions -- The road ahead: the empirical strategy -- The European Union: economic geography and fiscal structures under centrifugal representation -- North America's divide: distributive tensions, risk sharing, and the centralization of public insurance in federations -- Germany's reunification: distributive tensions and fiscal structures and under centripetal representation -- Endogenous decentralization and welfare resilience: Spain, 1978-2007 -- The ; legacy of history -- The political geography of inequality: summary and implications.
• Sommario/riassunto: This book addresses two questions - why some political systems have more centralized systems of interpersonal redistribution than others, and why some political unions make larger efforts to equalize resources among their constituent units than others. This book presents a new theory of the origin of fiscal structures in systems with several levels of government. The argument points to two major factors to account for the variation in redistribution: the interplay between economic geography and political representation on the one hand, and the scope of interregional economic externalities on the other. To test the empirical implications derived from the argument, the book relies on in-depth studies of the choice of fiscal structures in unions as diverse as the European Union, Canada and the United States in the aftermath of the Great Depression; Germany before and after Reunification; and Spain after the transition to democracy.