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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910813729603321 |
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Autore |
Jalālzaʼī Mūsá K̲h̲ān |
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Titolo |
Whose army : Afghanistan's shrinking army, war criminals, private militias and the future of civil war / / Musa Khan Jalalzai |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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New York : , : Algora Publishing, , 2014 |
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©2014 |
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ISBN |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (214 p.) |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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National security - Afghanistan |
Internal security - Afghanistan |
Insurgency - Afghanistan |
Nation-building - Afghanistan |
Afghan War, 2001-2021 |
Afghanistan History 2001-2021 |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Description based upon print version of record. |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references and index. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Acknowledgements; Abbreviations; Preface; Foreword; Chapter 1. The Afghan Army from Alexander the Great to Hamid Karzai; Chapter 2. The Afghan National Army and Green on Blue Attacks; The Challenge of Green on Blue Attacks; Chapter 3. International Military Efforts and the Uncertain Future of the ANA; The Taliban Office in Qatar; The Transition of Security, ANA and the Taliban; The Security Transition; Phase One; Phase Two; Phase Three; Phase Four and Five; Chapter 4. Brigade-888, ANA, and War Criminals; Chapter 5. Blackwater, Private Contractors and Criminal Militias |
The Business of Private Militias in Afghanistan Chapter 6. The US Joint Special Operations Command, Blackwater and the Drone War; Drone Attacks in Pakistan from 2005 to 2013; Chapter. 7. State-Owned Criminal Militias; Regional Command Structure of the Afghan National Police; The Oath of Afghan National Police; Chapter 8. Marketing Terrorism and the Import/Export of Suicide Bombers; Marketing Terrorism and the Business of Fear; Chapter 9. An Incoherent Approach to the War; Chapter 10. War on Terror in a Failed Afghan State |
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Chapter 11. Afghan Intelligence, the Intelligence War and Intelligence Failure The Intelligence War Among 50 Nations in Afghanistan; Afghan Intelligence: Foreign Influence and Allegations of Torture; Chapter 12. Social Media, Cyber Terrorism and the Taliban's Tactical Intelligence; Cyber Terrorism; Licenses issued to Internet Services Provider Companies in Afghanistan; Chapter 13. The US-Afghan Strategic Partnership and the Pentagon's China-Phobia Policy; The Pentagon, the CIA and The Defense Clandestine Service; Chapter 14. The Pakistan Army War on Pashtuns |
Chapter 15. Afghanistan's Future and the Blueprint for Civil War Postscript; Appendix 1. Durand Line Agreement, November 12, 1893; Agreement between Amir Abdur Rahman Khan, G. C. S. I., and Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, K. C. I. E., C. S. I.; Appendix 2. Decree of the President of the Islamic Transitional State of Afghanistan; Appendix 3. Afghan Security Forces Command and Control Structure; Afghan National Army; Afghan National Army Air Corps Command and Control System; Defense Ministers of Afghanistan; Generals of ANA Military Command; Appendix 4. Size of the Afghan Security Forces 1978-2012 |
Afghan National Army plus Police Appendix 5. Foreign Forces Deployed in Afghanistan 2001-2012; Troops Committed to NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) by Country; NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan; Mission; Area of Responsibility; Contributing Nations; Appendix 6. Resolution against Drone Attacks; Bibliography; Index |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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As Western troops withdraw from Afghanistan, the Afghan National Army (ANA) has been tasked with securing the country. Having broken the system that was in place, the US and NATO are now leaving Afghanistan to face Taliban elements, criminal warlords, and private militias which disrupt any efforts to pull the nation together. Yet the ANA arose under foreign tutelage and will remain dependent upon foreign support for the foreseeable future. Thus it can only be seen by the majority of Afghans as a legacy of the occupation and not a 'national' institution. The ANA is shrinking by the day. Musa Kh |
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