Financial stability frameworks and the role of central banks : lessons from the crisis / / prepared by Erlend W. Nier

• Record Nr.: UNINA9910812320203321
• Autore: Nier Erlend
• Pubbl/distr/stampa: [Washington D.C.], : International Monetary Fund, 2009
• ISBN: 1-4623-5577-3; 1-4527-3998-6; 1-4518-7217-8; 9786612842917; 1-282-84291-9
• Edizione: [1st ed.]
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (66 p.)
• Collana: IMF working paper ; ; WP/09/70
• Disciplina: 332.152
• Soggetti: Economic stabilization; Banks and banking, Central
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Note generali: Description based upon print version of record.
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references.
• Nota di contenuto: Contents; Executive Summary; I. The Role of Central Banks in Financial Stability-Lessons from the Crisis; A. Monetary Policy; B. Provision of Systemic Liquidity; C. Lender of Last Resort and Resolution of Failing Institutions; D. Oversight of Payment and Settlement Systems; II. Costs and Benefits of a Role of Central Banks in Financial Regulation; III. Recent Debates on Financial Stability Frameworks; IV. Financial Regulation-Objectives, Tools, Scope; A. Why Regulate Financial Institutions?; B. How to Regulate Financial Institutions?; C. Who Should be Regulated?; Boxes; 1. Originate and Distribute and Systemic RiskV. Financial Regulation-Agency Structure; A. Principles; B. Comparison of Existing Structures; 2. Financial Stability Frameworks Across Countries; 3. Special Considerations for Government Sponsored Entities; 4. International Considerations; VI. Conclusions; References; Appendixes; I. Some Preliminary Empirical Analysis; Figures; 1. Developed Europe: Bank Losses; 2. Developed Europe: Overall Loss to Credit Ratio
• Sommario/riassunto: This paper sets out general principles for the design of financial stability frameworks, starting from an analysis of the objectives and ; tools of financial regulation. The paper then offers a comprehensive analysis of the costs and benefits of the two main models that have emerged for modern financial systems: the integrated model, with a single supervisor outside of the central bank, and the twin-peaks model, with a systemic risk regulator (central bank) on the one hand and a conduct of business regulator on the other. The paper concludes that the twin-peaks model may become more attractive when regulatory structures are geared more explicitly towards the mitigation of systemic risk-including through the introduction of new macroprudential tools that could be used alongside monetary policy to contain macro-systemic risks; through enhanced regulation and special resolution regimes for systemically important institutions; and a more holistic approach to the oversight of clearing and settlement systems. Since the optimal solution may well be path-dependent and specific to the development of financial markets in any given country, a number of hybrid models are also discussed.