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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910812075603321 |
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Autore |
Barry Brian M. |
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Titolo |
Political argument / / Brian Barry |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Abingdon, Oxon ; ; New York, N.Y. : , : Routledge, , 2011, c1965 |
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ISBN |
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1-136-83258-0 |
1-136-83259-9 |
1-283-24208-7 |
9786613242082 |
0-203-83190-X |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (277 p.) |
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Collana |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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First published in 1965 by Routledge and Kegan Paul Limited. |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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BOOK COVER; TITLE; COPYRIGHT; CONTENTS; ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS; INTRODUCTION; I: EVALUATION; II: LANGUAGE; III: POLITICAL PRINCIPLES; IV: CONSERVATISM, MAJORITARIANISM AND LIBERALISM; V: TYPES OF SOCIAL DECISION PROCEDURE; VI: JUSTICE AND FAIRNESS; VII: EQUALITY, INTEGRATION AND NON-DISCRIMINATION; VIII: FREEDOM AND NATURAL RIGHTS; IX: EQUITY; X: THE CONCEPT OF INTEREST; XI: OTHER AGGREGATIVE CONCEPTS; XII: APPLICATIONS OF 'THE PUBLIC INTEREST'; XIII: JUSTIFICATIONS OF 'THE PUBLIC INTEREST'; XIV: CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICE AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1) |
XV: CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICE AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (2)CONCLUSION; NOTES; BIBLIOGRAPHY; INDEX |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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Since its publication in 1965, Brian Barry's seminal work has occupied an important role in the revival of Anglo-American political philosophy. A number of ideas and terms in it have become part of the standard vocabulary, such as the distinction between ""ideal-regarding"" and ""want-regarding"" principles and the division of principles into aggregative and distributive. The book provided the first precise analysis of the concept of political values having trade-off relations and its analysis of the notion of the public interest has also been significant. |
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