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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910811443903321 |
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Autore |
Laurens Bernard |
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Titolo |
The Measurement of Central Bank Autonomy : : Survey of Models, Indicators, and Empirical Evidence / / Bernard Laurens, Marco Arnone, Jean-François Segalotto |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2006 |
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ISBN |
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1-4623-4778-9 |
1-4519-9338-2 |
1-283-51351-X |
9786613825964 |
1-4519-0940-3 |
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Edizione |
[1st ed.] |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (85 p.) |
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Collana |
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Altri autori (Persone) |
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ArnoneMarco |
SegalottoJean-François |
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Soggetti |
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Banks and banking, Central - Management - Econometric models |
Monetary policy - Econometric models |
Inflation |
Labor |
Macroeconomics |
Public Finance |
Price Level |
Deflation |
Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General |
Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: Public Policy |
Debt |
Debt Management |
Sovereign Debt |
Central Banks and Their Policies |
Monetary Policy |
Public finance & taxation |
Labour |
income economics |
Legal support in revenue administration |
Price stabilization |
Wage bargaining |
Government debt management |
Prices |
Revenue administration |
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Public financial management (PFM) |
Revenue |
Government policy |
Wages |
Debts, Public |
United States |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references (p.79-85). |
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Nota di contenuto |
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""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION TO INDICATORS OF CENTRAL BANK AUTONOMY""; ""II. BASE INDICATORS OF DE JURE AUTONOMY""; ""III. SUBSEQUENT LITERATURE AND EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON BASE INDICATORS""; ""IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS""; ""Appendix I. Statistical Tables""; ""Appendix II. Summary of Base Indicators of De Jure Autonomy Robin Bade, Michael Parkin ( 1977).""; ""Appendix III. Summary of Base Indicators of De Facto Autonomy Alex Cukierman ( 1992).""; ""Appendix IV. Summary of Empirical Studies on De Jure Autonomy""; ""Appendix V. Summary of Empirical Studies on De Facto Autonomy""; ""REFERENCES"" |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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This paper presents a survey of the literature on the measurement of central bank autonomy. We distinguish inputs that constitute the building blocks in the literature, and the literature that builds on them. Issues including sensitivity analysis, robustness, and endogeneity are discussed. The review shows that empirical evidence regarding the beneficial effects of central bank autonomy is substantial, although some technical issues still remain for further research. In particular, central bank autonomy raises the issue of subjecting the monetary authorities to democratic control; this calls for additional research on the linkages between central bank autonomy and accountability and transparency. Additional empirical analysis on the relationship between the financial strength of the central bank and its de facto autonomy, and between its autonomy and financial stability, would also be desirable. |
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