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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910809512303321 |
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Titolo |
The new financial architecture : banking regulation in the 21st century / / edited by Benton E. Gup |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Westport, Conn., : Quorum Books, 2000 |
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ISBN |
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Edizione |
[1st ed.] |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (269 p.) |
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Altri autori (Persone) |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Banks and banking, International - Law and legislation |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references and index. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Cover -- The New Financial Architecture -- Contents -- Illustrations -- Preface -- ADDITIONAL RESOURCES -- 1 Regulating International Banking:Rationale, History, and FutureProspects -- INTRODUCTION -- WHY DO WE REGULATE MULTINATIONAL BANKS? -- HISTORY OF SUPERVISORY COOPERATION -- The Bank for International Settlements and the Basle Committee -- The 1999 Basle Proposal -- Other International Agreements -- THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING REGULATION -- REFERENCES -- 2 Are Banks and TheirRegulators Outdated? -- INTRODUCTION -- WHAT IS A BANK? -- A PATCHWORK SYSTEM OF REGULATION -- THE FUNCTIONS OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM -- FUNCTIONAL REGULATION -- The Central Bank as the Regulator -- Global Regulator -- CONCLUSION -- NOTES -- REFERENCES -- 3 Designing the New Architecturefor U.S. Banking -- DISSATISFACTION WITH THE OLD ARCHITECTURE -- LEGISLATING THE NEW ARCHITECTURE -- DANGERS OF THE "WRONG" ARCHITECTURE -- FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE AND ASSET PRICE BUBBLES -- NOTES -- REFERENCES -- 4 What Is Optimal FinancialRegulation? -- INTRODUCTION -- RATIONALES FOR FINANCIAL REGULATION -- Guarding Against Systemic Risk -- Protecting Consumers -- Enhancing Efficiency -- Achieving Other Social Objectives -- WHY BANKS HAVE BEEN ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT -- PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AND SUPERVISION: THE FINANCIAL SAFETY NET -- OPTIMAL REGULATION IN THE STATIC CASE: PRICING RISK TO COUNTER MORAL HAZARD -- Risk-Rated Deposit Insurance Premiums -- Prompt Corrective Action and |
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Least-Cost Resolution -- Subordinated Debt -- Narrow Bank Proposals -- LOOKING BEYOND THE STATIC VIEW: BANKS HAVE BECOME LESS SPECIAL -- "OPTIMAL" REGULATION IN THE TRANSITION: SOME SIMPLE PRESCRIPTIONS -- NOTES -- REFERENCES -- 5 The Optimum Regulatory Model forthe Next Millennium-Lessons fromInternational Comparisons and theAustralian-Asian Experience -- INTRODUCTION. |
A TAXONOMY OF REGULATORY MODELS FOR FINANCIAL SYSTEMS IN DIFFERENT LIFE CYCLE PHASES -- Prudential Supervisory Systems -- Protective Measures -- A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF REGULATORY MODELS GOVERNING THE AUSTRALIAN AND THE ASIAN FINANCIAL SYSTEMS -- Singapore -- Thailand -- Hong Kong -- Japan -- Taiwan -- Malaysia -- Indonesia -- Korea -- The Philippines -- IMPLICATIONS OF REGULATORY FAILURE IN THE AUSTRALASIAN REGION FOR THE OPTIMUM REGULATORY MODEL FOR THE NEXT MILLENNIUM -- The Usefulness of a Taxonomy of Regulatory Models Governing Financial Systems -- NOTES -- REFERENCES -- 6 Banking Trends and DepositInsurance Risk Assessment in theTwenty-First Century -- INTRODUCTION -- DEVELOPMENTS IN BANKING -- Consolidation -- Bank Activities -- Globalization -- Technological Change -- IMPLICATIONS FOR DEPOSIT INSURANCE -- BANK SUPERVISION AND REGULATION -- CONCLUSION -- NOTES -- REFERENCES -- 7 Supervisory Goals andSubordinated Debt -- SUPERVISORY GOALS -- HOW SND MAY CONTRIBUTE TO THE GOALS -- THE ROLE OF SND IN EXISTING CAPITAL REGULATIONS -- SND PROPOSALS TO ACHIEVE PUBLIC POLICY GOALS -- Minimize Safety Net Losses -- Loss Absorption -- Prompt Closure -- Minimizing the Probability of Failure -- Direct Discipline -- Derived Supervisory Discipline -- CONCLUSION -- NOTES -- REFERENCES -- 8 Market Discipline for Banks: AHistorical Review -- INTRODUCTION -- Historical Experiences -- INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES OF FREE BANKING -- The "Invisible Hand" in Free-Banking Theory -- THE FREE-BANKING EXPERIENCE IN SCOTLAND -- Scottish Banking: 1695-1845 -- A Successful Experience with Market Discipline? -- A Centralized System -- Stability and Optimality in Operations -- Scottish Free Banking Was Not Laissez-Faire Banking -- THE FREE-BANKING EXPERIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES -- Was American Free Banking Laissez-Faire Banking?. |
"Wildcat Banking" or Successful "Market Discipline"? -- The Suffolk Banking System -- UNREGULATED TRUSTS IN NEW YORK -- CONCLUSION -- REFERENCES -- 9 Market Discipline and theCorporate Governance of Banks:Theory vs. Evidence -- PRIVATE MARKET REGULATION -- PRINCIPAL AGENT CONFLICTS -- Control Mechanisms -- ARE MARKET CONTROL MECHANISMS EFFECTIVE? -- Corporate Behavior -- Distressed Banks -- Other Banking Studies -- Subordinated Debt -- REQUIREMENTS FOR MARKET DISCIPLINE -- Action -- Active Money and Capital Markets and Rating Agencies -- Awareness of Vulnerabilities -- Corporate Accounting Standards -- Transparency -- CONCLUSION -- NOTES -- REFERENCES -- 10 Message to Basle: Risk ReductionRather Than Management -- INTRODUCTION -- CREDIT RISK MODELS AND THEIR SHORTCOMINGS -- Credit Risk Models -- General Loan Valuations Features -- Loan Repricing -- Loan Valuation Models -- Default Mode -- Mark-to-Model Approach -- Credit Spreads -- Discounted Contractual Cash Flow (DCCF) Approach -- Limits of Bond Market Analogue -- Credit Risk Ratings -- Assessment of Ratings Agencies -- Ratings Predictions -- Credit Risk Is a Decision Variable-Market Risk Is a Given Parameter -- REFORM PROPOSALS -- Improvements in Quality of Credit Risk Analysis -- Loan Officers as Investment Analysts -- Combining Commercial and Investment Banking -- Improvements in Risk Ratings -- Rating over the Longer Horizon -- |
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Stress Testing by Ratings Agencies and Banks -- Linking Asset Risk to Country Rating -- Including Market Risk in Analysis -- Market Risk, Time Horizon, and Risk Migration -- Asymmetric Information Obscures the Issue -- Risk Correlations -- Loan Valuations -- Improvements in Supervisory-Lending Officer Linkage -- Training Supervisors -- Lack of Courage of Conviction -- Allow Failure of Large Financial Institutions and Disorderly Markets to Occur. |
CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY OF PROPOSALS -- NOTES -- REFERENCES -- 11 Drafting Land Legislation forDeveloping Countries: An Examplefrom East Africa -- INTRODUCTION -- THE BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF AN IDEA -- THE DRAFTING PROCESS -- Location, Staffing, and Power of the Tribunal -- Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the Tribunal -- Representation and the Expedited Process of Hearing a Dispute -- The Operating Procedure of the Tribunal -- Miscellaneous -- CONCLUSION -- APPENDIX A Table of Contents of the Sections of the Zanzibar LandTribunal Act19 -- APPENDIX B Table of Contents of the Sections of the Zanzibar LandTribunal Act Regulations -- APPENDIX C Table of Contents: List of Forms to Accompany the LandTribunal Act -- NOTES -- Index -- About the Editor and Contributors. |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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A resource for banking, finance, investment and world trade professionals and their academic counterparts. It covers a wide range of topics, from the rationale of banking regulation, to optimal banking regulation in the new world environments. |
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