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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910808947903321 |
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Autore |
Timpe Kevin |
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Titolo |
Free will [[electronic resource] ] : sourcehood and its alternatives / / Kevin Timpe |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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London ; ; New York, : Continuum, c2008 |
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ISBN |
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1-282-87151-X |
9786612871511 |
1-4411-1504-8 |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (166 p.) |
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Collana |
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Continuum studies in philosophy |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Free will and determinism |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Description based upon print version of record. |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references (p. [122]-151) and index. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Introducing the issues -- Alternative possibilities -- The importance of sourcehood. |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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Much contemporary scholarship on free will focuses on whether it is compatible with causal determinism. According to compatibilists, it is possible for an agent to be determined in all her choices and actions and still be free. Incompatibilists, on the other hand, think that the existence of free will is incompatible with the truth of determinism. There are two dominant general conceptions of the nature of free will. According to the first of these, free will is primarily a function of being able to do otherwise than one in fact does. On this view, free will centrally depends upon alternati |
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