1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910808547903321

Autore

Long Austin G.

Titolo

The Soul of Armies : Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Military Culture in the US and UK / / Austin Long

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Ithaca, NY : , : Cornell University Press, , [2016]

©2016

ISBN

1-5017-0390-0

1-5017-0391-9

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (288 p.)

Collana

Cornell Studies in Security Affairs

Disciplina

355.02/180941

Soggetti

Counterinsurgency

Military doctrine - Great Britain

Military doctrine - United States

Great Britain Armed Forces Attitudes

United States Armed Forces Attitudes

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Description based upon print version of record.

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Nota di contenuto

Front matter -- Contents -- Preface -- Chapter 1. Military Doctrine and the Challenge of Counterinsurgency -- Chapter 2. Culture, Doctrine, and Military Professionalization -- Chapter 3. "The Habits and Usages of War" -- Chapter 4. From the Halls of Montezuma -- Chapter 5. A Family of Regiments -- Chapter 6. "A Nasty, Untidy Mess" -- Chapter 7. A Natural Experiment in I Corps, 1966-68 -- Chapter 8. Out of Africa -- Chapter 9. Counterinsurgency in the Land of Two Rivers -- Chapter 10. Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, 2003-11 -- Conclusions -- Notes -- Index

Sommario/riassunto

For both the United States and United Kingdom counterinsurgency was a serious component of security policy during the Cold War and, along with counterterrorism, has been the greatest security challenge after September 11, 2001. In The Soul of Armies Austin Long compares and contrasts counterinsurgency operations during the Cold War and in recent years by three organizations: the US Army, the US Marine Corps, and the British Army. Long argues that the formative experiences of these three organizations as they professionalized in the nineteenth



century has produced distinctive organizational cultures that shape operations. Combining archival research on counterinsurgency campaigns in Vietnam and Kenya with the author's personal experience as a civilian advisor to the military in Iraq and Afghanistan, The Soul of Armies demonstrates that the US Army has persistently conducted counterinsurgency operations in a very different way from either the US Marine Corps or the British Army. These differences in conduct have serious consequences, affecting the likelihood of success, the potential for civilian casualties and collateral damage, and the ability to effectively support host nation governments. Long concludes counterinsurgency operations are at best only a partial explanation for success or failure.