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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910808040203321 |
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Autore |
McEvoy Joanne |
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Titolo |
Power-sharing executives : governing in Bosnia, Macedonia, and Northern Ireland / / Joanne McEvoy |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Philadelphia, Pennsylvania : , : University of Pennsylvania Press, , 2015 |
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©2015 |
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ISBN |
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Edizione |
[1st ed.] |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (288 p.) |
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Collana |
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National and Ethnic Conflict in the 21st Century |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Representative government and representation |
Minorities - Political activity |
Ethnic groups - Political activity |
Ethnic conflict - Political aspects |
Cultural pluralism - Political aspects |
Bosnia and Hercegovina Politics and government |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Front matter -- CONTENTS -- 1. Power Sharing, Institutional Design, and External Act -- 2. The Sunningdale Executive: Lessons from Failed Power Sharing -- 3. The Good Friday Agreement 1998: An Inclusive Coalition -- 4. The 2007–11 Executive: A New Era in Northern Ireland Politics? -- 5. Power-Sharing Stalemate in Post- Dayton Bosnia -- 6. From Dayton to Brussels? -- 7. Macedonia: From Independence to the Ohrid Framework Agreement -- 8. Toward a Binational Macedonia? -- Conclusion -- Notes -- Index -- Acknowledgments |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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To achieve peaceful interethnic relations and a stable democracy in the aftermath of violent conflict, institutional designers may task political elites representing previously warring sides with governing a nation together. In Power-Sharing Executives, Joanne McEvoy asks whether certain institutional rules can promote cooperation between political parties representing the contending groups in a deeply divided place. Examining the different experiences of post conflict power sharing in Bosnia, Macedonia, and Northern Ireland, she finds that with certain incentives and norms in place, power sharing can indeed provide |
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