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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910807338503321 |
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Autore |
Chatterjee Kalyan |
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Titolo |
Bargaining in the shadow of the market : selected papers on bilateral and multilateral bargaining / / Kalyan Chatterjee, the Pennsylvania State University, USA |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Singapore, : World Scientific, 2013 |
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New Jersey : , : World Scientific, , [2013] |
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�2013 |
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ISBN |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (xi, 216 pages) : illustrations |
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Collana |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Negotiation in business |
Negotiation |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Description based upon print version of record. |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Preface; Acknowledgments; Contents; 1. Bilateral and Multilateral Bargaining: An Introduction; 1 Motivation for Studying this Field; 2 Models; 3 Bilateral Bargaining with Complete Information; 4 Bilateral Bargaining with Incomplete Information; 5 Search for Outside Options; 6 Choice of Investment and Outside Options in Bargaining; 7 Non-Cooperative Coalitional Bargaining; 8 Conclusion; References; 2. Bargaining and Search with Incomplete Information about Outside Options; 1. INTRODUCTION AND THE MODEL; 2. THE ANALYSIS; 2.1. The Buyer's Behavior in the Second Period; 2.2. The Equilibrium of a |
2.3. The Equilibrium of b2.4. The Equilibrium of; 3. DISCUSSION; 4. CONCLUSIONS; APPENDIX A: PROOF OF LEMMA 2; APPENDIX B: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6A; APPENDIX C: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6B; APPENDIX D: PROOF OF LEMMA 3; APPENDIX E: PROOFS OF PROPOSITION 8 AND PROPOSITION 9; REFERENCES; 3. Rubinstein Auctions: On Competition for Bargaining Partners; 1. INTRODUCTION; 2. THREE TRADING PROCESSES; 3. THE PUBLIC OFFERS MODEL; 4. THE TARGETTED OFFERS MODEL; 5. PRIVATE OFFERS MODEL; 6. CONCLUSION; APPENDIX; REFERENCES; 4. Bargaining, Competition and Efficient Investment; 1 Introduction; 1.1 Main features |
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1.2 Related literature2 The Model; 2.1 Payoffs and seller/buyer investment; 3 Equilibrium of Extensive Form 1 (The "Auction-Like" Mechanism); 4 Investment in the "Auction-like" Mechanism; 4.1 The seller investment decision; 4.1.1 Comparison with the single buyer case; 4.2 Buyer investment with the auction-like mechanism; 5 Sequential Offers Extensive Form; 5.1 The bargaining procedure; 5.2 Seller investment under sequential offers bargaining; 5.3 Buyer investment; 6 Discussion about Property Rights and Conclusions; References; 5. A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining |
1. INTRODUCTION2. THE EXTENSIVE FORM; 3. STATIONARY EQUILIBRIUM AND DELAY; 3.1. No-delay stationary equilibrium; 4. STATIONARY EQUILIBRIUM AND EFFICIENCY; 4.1. Efficiency of stationary equilibria for all protocols; 4.2. Efficiency for some protocol; 5. EFFICIENCY OF STATIONARY EQUILIBRIA: STRICTLY CONVEX GAMES; 6. CONCLUSION; Acknowledgements; REFERENCES; 6. How Communication Links Influence Coalition Bargaining: A Laboratory Investigation; 1. Introduction: The Role of Communication in Coalition Bargaining; 2. The Experiment: A Game, Communication Configurations, and Two Benchmark Models |
3. Laboratory Protocol4. Data Analysis; 4.1. Coalition Formation; 4.2. Controlling Communication; 4.3. Coalition Allocations; 4.4. Round Effects; 5. Discussion: Explaining the Data; 5.1. Comparing the Data with the Models; 5.2. Why the Modified Core Falls Short; 5.3. Private Communication and the Public Treatment; 5.4. Toward a More Formal Model; 6. Summary; Acknowledgments; Appendix A: Written Instructions to Subjects; Appendix B: Rotation of Bargaining Partners; References; 7. Pre-electoral Coalitions and Post-election Bargaining; The Model; Parties, Voters and Preferences; Elections |
Post-Election Bargaining |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market - Selected Papers on Bilateral and Multilateral Bargaining consists of selected research in bargaining carried out by Kalyan Chatterjee by himself and with various co-authors. Chatterjee has been one of the earliest researchers to work on noncooperative bargaining theory and has contributed to bilateral bargaining with parties having private information as well as multilateral coalition formation models. Some of his work in each of these areas finds place here.The main theme of this collection of papers is the nature of negotiations when participants have |
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