| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1. |
Record Nr. |
UNINA9910799241903321 |
|
|
Titolo |
Decision and Game Theory for Security [[electronic resource] ] : 14th International Conference, GameSec 2023, Avignon, France, October 18–20, 2023, Proceedings / / edited by Jie Fu, Tomas Kroupa, Yezekael Hayel |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Pubbl/distr/stampa |
|
|
Cham : , : Springer Nature Switzerland : , : Imprint : Springer, , 2023 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ISBN |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Edizione |
[1st ed. 2023.] |
|
|
|
|
|
Descrizione fisica |
|
1 online resource (XXIX, 390 p. 95 illus., 76 illus. in color.) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Collana |
|
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, , 1611-3349 ; ; 14167 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Disciplina |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Soggetti |
|
Data protection |
Computer engineering |
Computer networks |
Artificial intelligence |
Data and Information Security |
Computer Engineering and Networks |
Artificial Intelligence |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Lingua di pubblicazione |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
|
|
|
|
|
Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
|
|
|
|
|
Nota di contenuto |
|
Mechanism design and imperfect information -- Observable Perfect Equilibrium -- Playing Repeated Coopetitive Polymatrix Games with Small Manipulation Cost -- Rule Enforcing Through Ordering -- Security Games -- Multi-defender Security Games with Schedules -- Asymmetric Centrality Game against Network Epidemic Propagation -- Shades of Grey: Strategic Bimatrix Stopping Games for Modelling (Un)Ethical Hacking Roles -- Learning in security games -- Characterizing and Improving the Robustness of Predict-Then-Optimize Frameworks -- Quantisation Effects in Adversarial Cyber-Physical GamesTakuma Adams -- Scalable Learning of Intrusion Responses through Recursive Decomposition -- Cyber deception -- Honeypot Allocation for Cyber Deception in Dynamic Tactical Networks: A Game Theoretic Approach -- Optimal Resource Allocation for Proactive Defense with Deception in Probabilistic Attack Graphs -- The Credential is Not Enough: Combining Honeypots and Fake Credentials for Cyber-Defense -- |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Economics of security -- Does Cyber-insurance Benefit the Insured or the Attacker? -- A Game of Cyber-Insurance -- Rational Broadcast Protocols against Timid Adversaries -- FlipPath Game to Counter Stealthy Attacks in SDN-based Tactical Networks -- Information and privacy -- Double-sided Information Asymmetry in Double Extortion Ransomware -- Opacity-enforcing active perception and control against eavesdropping attacks -- A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Auditing Differentially Private Algorithms with Epistemically Disparate Herd -- Modeling and Analysis of a Nonlinear Security Game with Mixed Armament -- Short articles -- Incentive-Based Software Security: Fair Micro-Payments for Writing Secure Code -- Using Game Theory Approach for COVID-19 Risk Analysis and Medical Resource Allocation -- Shapley Value to Rank Vulnerabilities on Attack Graphs: Applications to Cyberdeception -- Solving security models with perfect observability. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Sommario/riassunto |
|
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2023, held in Avignon, France, during October 18–20, 2023. The 19 full papers and 4 short papers included in this book were carefully reviewed and selected from 33 submissions. They were organized in topical sections as follows: Mechanism design and imperfect information, Security Games, Learning in security games, Cyber deception, Economics of security, Information and privacy and Short articles. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |