1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910797135603321

Titolo

The constitution of phenomenal consciousness : toward a science and theory / / edited by Steven M. Miller

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Amsterdam, Netherlands ; ; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania : , : John Benjamins Pubishing Company, , 2015

©2015

ISBN

90-272-6878-9

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (481 p.)

Collana

Advances in Consciousness Research, , 1381-589X ; ; Volume 92

Disciplina

612.8/23

Soggetti

Consciousness - Physiological aspects

Binocular rivalry

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Description based upon print version of record.

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references at the end of each chapters and index.

Nota di contenuto

2.1 Minimizing top-down attention with a demanding concurrent task 2.2 Neural effects of reports ; 2.3 Memory confound: Amnesia or blindness? ; 3. On sufficiency and necessity ; 3.1 Report ; 3.2 Iconic and/or fragile memory ; 4. Conclusion ; References ; The correlation/constitution distinction problem: Foundations, limits and explanation in consciousne; 1. Introduction ; 2. Two paths to the problem ; 3. Another look at the foundations of consciousness science ; 4. Stepwise inhibition ; 5. The Jenga analogy ; 6. Stepwise stimulation and combined inhibition/stimulation ; 7. Clarifications

7.1 Between- and within-region cases 7.2 Linking, binding or index processes ; 7.3 A caveat on isolated stimulation ; 7.4 The Cr/Cn distinction problem for enabling factors ; 8. Objections ; 8.1 Definition objections ; 8.2 Triviality objection ; 8.3 Wait-and-see objection ; 8.4 Integrated Information Theory objection ; 8.5 Specificity objection ; 8.6 Theoretical loading objection ; 9. Related scientific and philosophic issues ; 9.1 A mereology of phenomenal consciousness ; 9.2 The relation between brain and mind ; 9.3 Epistemic limits and ontology

10. New foundations for the science of consciousness

Sommario/riassunto

Philosophers have largely abandoned the claim that the special sciences will ultimately reduce to microphysics in favour of the view that the



special sciences trade in functional explanations. However, a careful examination of scientific practice reveals that the explanatory strategy of the special sciences is neither reductionist nor functionalist, but mechanistic. Mechanistic explanations appeal to active material entities organized so as to produce the target phenomena. We claim that phenomenal consciousness will also succumb to mechanistic explanation: it will turn out to be the activity o