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1. |
Record Nr. |
UNINA9910793517003321 |
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Autore |
Susi Mart <1965-> |
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Titolo |
Human rights, digital society, and the law : a research companion / / Mart Susi |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Abingdon, Oxon [UK] ; ; New York, NY : , : Routledge, , 2019 |
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ISBN |
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1-351-02536-8 |
1-351-02538-4 |
1-351-02537-6 |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (412 pages) |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Right to Internet access |
Human rights |
Internet - Access control - Law and legislation |
Internet - Political aspects |
Data protection - Law and legislation |
Freedom of information |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references and index. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Right to the Internet and rights inside the Internet : theoretical dimension -- Legislation, judicial and stakeholder practices : practical dimension -- Specific issues related to human rights and the Internet -- Data protection issues -- Global perspective. |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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The Internet has created a formidable challenge for human rights law and practice worldwide. International scholarly and policy-oriented communities have so far established a consensus regarding only one main aspect - human rights in the internet are the same as offline. There are emerging and ongoing debates regarding not only the standards and methods to be used for achieving the "sameness" of rights online, but also whether "classical" human rights as we know them are contested by the online environment. The internet itself, in view of its cross-border nature and its ability to affect various areas of law, requires adopting an internationally oriented approach and a perspective strongly focused on social sciences. In particular, the rise of the internet, enhanced also by the influence of new technologies |
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such as algorithms and intelligent artificial systems, has influenced individuals' civil, political and social rights not only in the digital world, but also in the atomic realm. As the coming of the internet calls into question well-established legal categories, a broader perspective than the domestic one is necessary to investigate this phenomenon. This book explores the main fundamental issues and practical dimensions related to the safeguarding of human rights in the internet, which are at the focus of current academic debates. It provides a comprehensive analysis with a forward-looking perspective of bringing order into the somewhat chaotic online dimension of human rights. It addresses the matter of private digital censorship, the apparent inefficiency of existing judicial systems to react to human rights violations online, the uncertainty of liability for online human rights violations, whether the concern with personal data protection overshadows multiple other human rights issues online and will be of value to those interested in human rights law and legal regulation of the internet. |
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2. |
Record Nr. |
UNINA9910831076603321 |
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Autore |
Brockmann Christian <1954-> |
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Titolo |
Construction microeconomics / / Christian Brockmann |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Hoboken, NJ : , : John Wiley & Sons, Inc., , [2023] |
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©2023 |
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ISBN |
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1-119-83193-8 |
1-119-83191-1 |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (413 pages) |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Contractors' operations |
Construction industry - Economic aspects |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Brief Contents -- Contents -- Foreword by Gerard de Valence -- Preface -- Chapter 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Navigating the Maze of Economic Literature -- 1.1.1 Economics -- |
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1.1.2 Microeconomics -- 1.1.3 Macroeconomics -- 1.1.4 Construction Economics -- 1.2 Tools and Presentations -- 1.2.1 Definitions -- 1.2.2 Economic Scholars -- 1.2.3 Assumptions -- 1.2.4 Case Studies -- 1.2.5 Observations -- 1.2.6 Summaries -- 1.3 Methodological Approach -- 1.3.1 Laws and Regularities -- 1.3.2 Focus and Goals -- 1.3.3 Descriptive and Normative Economics -- 1.4 Theoretical Background -- 1.4.1 Industrial Organization -- 1.4.2 New Institutional Economics -- 1.4.3 Game Theory -- 1.4.4 Auction Theory -- 1.4.5 Behavioral Economics -- 1.4.6 Economics of Information -- 1.4.7 Law and Economics -- 1.5 What You Can and Cannot Expect -- 1.6 Audience -- 1.6.1 Students -- 1.6.2 Lecturers -- 1.6.3 Academics -- 1.6.4 Contractors -- 1.6.5 Owners -- 1.6.6 Policymakers -- 1.7 Structure of the Text -- 1.7.1 Basic Economic Principles -- 1.7.2 Consumers in Perfectly Competitive Markets -- 1.7.3 Producers in Perfectly Competitive Markets -- 1.7.4 Interaction in Perfectly Competitive Markets -- 1.7.5 Imperfect Markets -- 1.7.6 Factor Markets -- 1.7.7 Information, Risk, and Uncertainty -- 1.7.8 Game Theory and Auctions -- 1.7.9 Construction Sector -- 1.7.10 Theory of the Owner -- 1.7.11 Theory of the Contractor -- 1.7.12 Construction Goods -- 1.7.13 Construction Markets -- 1.7.14 Contracting -- 1.7.15 Market Imperfections -- 1.7.16 Government -- 1.7.17 Public Construction Goods -- 1.7.18 Conclusion -- 1.7.19 Synopsis -- References -- Part I Microeconomics -- Chapter 2 Basic Economic Principles -- 2.1 Consensual Ideas -- 2.2 Scarcity and Choice -- 2.3 Decision-Making -- 2.3.1 Opportunity Costs -- 2.3.2 Incentives -- 2.3.3 Marginal Decisions. |
2.4 Markets -- 2.5 Trade and Comparative Advantage -- 2.6 Government -- References -- Chapter 3 Consumers in Perfectly Competitive Markets -- 3.1 Perfectly Competitive Markets -- 3.2 Consumer Behavior -- 3.2.1 Budget Constraint -- 3.2.2 Preferences and Utility Functions -- 3.2.3 Utility Maximization -- 3.3 Demand Curve -- 3.4 Further Reading -- References -- Chapter 4 Producers in Perfectly Competitive Markets -- 4.1 Producer Behavior -- 4.2 Production Theory -- 4.2.1 Technology -- 4.2.2 Production Functions -- 4.2.2.1 Classical Production Function -- 4.2.2.2 Neoclassical Production Function -- 4.2.2.3 Limitational Production Function -- 4.2.2.4 Technological Change (Innovation) and Learning -- 4.3 Cost Theory -- 4.3.1 Cost Curves for Classical Production Functions -- 4.3.2 Cost Curves for Neoclassical Production Functions -- 4.3.3 Cost Curves for Limitational Production Functions -- 4.3.4 Simplified Cost Function with Constantly Increasing Variable Costs -- 4.3.5 Long-Run Cost Curves -- 4.4 Supply Curve -- 4.4.1 Short-Run Supply Curve of a Firm -- 4.4.2 Long-Run Supply Curve of a Firm -- 4.4.3 Market Supply Curve -- References -- Chapter 5 Interaction in Perfectly Competitive Markets -- 5.1 Equilibrium Price and Quantity -- 5.2 Comparative Statics -- 5.3 Elasticities of Demand and Supply -- 5.4 Consumer and Producer Surplus -- 5.5 Time-Dependent Supply Curves and Market Outcomes -- 5.5.1 Very-Short-Run Supply Curve -- 5.5.2 Short-Run Supply Curve -- 5.5.3 Long-Run Supply Curve -- 5.6 Welfare -- 5.7 Efficiency and Equity -- References -- Chapter 6 Imperfect Markets -- 6.1 Monopoly -- 6.1.1 Normal Monopolies -- 6.1.2 Natural Monopolies -- 6.2 Monopolistic Competition -- 6.3 Monopsony -- 6.4 Oligopoly -- References -- Chapter 7 Factor Markets -- 7.1 Factor Supply of Households -- 7.1.1 Labor Supply -- 7.1.2 Capital Supply -- 7.2 Factor Demand of Firms. |
7.3 Demand and Supply on Factor Markets -- References -- Chapter 8 Uncertainty, Risk, and Information -- 8.1 Uncertainty and Risk -- 8.1.1 Risk Attitudes -- 8.1.2 Risk Strategies -- 8.1.3 Transaction Cost |
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Theory -- 8.2 Information -- 8.2.1 Satisficing Model of Decision-Making -- 8.2.2 Asymmetric Information -- 8.2.2.1 Principal-Agent Theory -- 8.2.2.2 Market Breakdown Due to Asymmetric Information -- 8.2.2.3 Hidden Characteristics and Adverse Selection -- 8.2.2.4 Hidden Intentions and Holdup -- 8.2.2.5 Hidden Action and Moral Hazard -- 8.2.3 Property Rights Theory -- References -- Chapter 9 Game Theory and Auctions -- 9.1 Game Theory -- 9.1.1 Basics of Game Theory -- 9.1.2 Static Games with Complete Information -- 9.1.3 Dynamic Games with Complete Information -- 9.2 Auctions -- 9.2.1 Basics of Auctions -- 9.2.2 English and Vickrey Auctions -- 9.2.3 Dutch Auctions and Sealed-Bid Auctions -- 9.2.4 Competitive Bidding -- References -- Part II Applied Construction Microeconomics -- Chapter 10 Construction Sector -- 10.1 Definition -- 10.2 Economic Contribution -- 10.2.1 Value-Added Concept -- 10.2.2 Investment Concept -- 10.2.3 Multiplier Concept -- 10.3 Actors in the Construction Sector -- 10.3.1 Market Demand -- 10.3.2 Market Supply -- 10.4 Summary of the Construction Sector -- References -- Chapter 11 Theory of the Owner -- 11.1 The Owner as an Entity -- 11.1.1 Terminology -- 11.1.2 Images and Prejudices -- 11.1.3 Organization -- 11.2 Tasks of the Owner -- 11.3 Behavior of the Owner -- 11.3.1 Consumers Buying Construction Goods -- 11.3.2 Producers Buying Construction Goods -- 11.4 Information of the Owner -- 11.5 Developing a Contract -- 11.6 Procurement of a Contractor -- 11.7 Supervision of the Construction Process -- 11.8 Summary -- References -- Chapter 12 Theory of the Contractor -- 12.1 The Contractor as an Entity -- 12.1.1 Cooperation. |
12.1.2 Organization -- 12.2 Tasks of the Contractor -- 12.3 Behavior of the Contractor -- 12.3.1 Strategy -- 12.3.2 Legal Organization -- 12.3.3 Growth of the Firm -- 12.4 Information of the Contractor -- 12.5 Bidding -- 12.6 Contractor Pricing -- 12.7 Production -- 12.7.1 General Characteristics -- 12.7.2 Production Determinants -- 12.7.2.1 Production Line, Work Shop, Site Construction, Parallel, or Variable Production -- 12.7.2.2 Automatization -- 12.7.2.3 Mass or Single-Item Production -- 12.7.2.4 Continuous and Discontinuous Production -- 12.7.2.5 Summary of Production Types -- 12.7.3 Production Functions and Cost Curves -- 12.7.4 Production Decisions -- 12.8 Summary -- References -- Chapter 13 Construction Goods -- 13.1 Goods and Services -- 13.1.1 Heterogeneity -- 13.1.2 Construction Goods as Transitional Performance Bundles -- 13.1.3 Construction Goods as Contract Goods -- 13.1.4 Construction Goods as Investment -- 13.1.5 Construction Goods as Services -- 13.1.6 Summary of the Characteristics of Construction Goods -- 13.2 Typology of Construction Goods -- 13.2.1 Approach to Developing a Typology -- 13.2.2 Conceptualization -- 13.2.2.1 Choice of Dimensions -- 13.2.2.2 Typical Cases -- 13.2.2.3 Typology -- 13.2.3 Applications -- 13.2.3.1 Market Entry -- 13.2.3.2 Optimum Firm Size -- 13.2.3.3 Strategic Planning -- 13.3 Summary -- References -- Chapter 14 Construction Markets -- 14.1 Characteristics of Markets -- 14.2 Particularities of Construction Markets -- 14.2.1 Goods -- 14.2.2 Owners -- 14.2.3 Markets -- 14.2.4 Summary -- 14.3 Analysis of Construction Markets -- 14.3.1 Heterogeneity -- 14.3.1.1 Observation -- 14.3.1.2 Theory -- 14.3.1.3 Organization -- 14.3.1.4 Structure -- 14.3.1.5 Specialization -- 14.3.1.6 Law -- 14.4 Owners -- 14.5 Contractors -- 14.5.1 Supply -- 14.5.2 Information -- 14.6 Geography of Construction Markets. |
14.6.1 Regional Markets -- 14.6.2 National Markets -- 14.6.3 International Markets -- 14.6.4 Multinational Markets -- 14.6.5 Global Players and Global Markets -- 14.7 Entry and Exit Barriers -- 14.7.1 Effects of the Business Cycle -- 14.7.2 Number of Exits and Entries -- |
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14.8 Summary -- References -- Chapter 15 Contracting -- 15.1 Construction Goods -- 15.2 Construction Markets -- 15.3 Owner's Demand -- 15.4 Contractor's Supply -- 15.5 Construction Contracts -- 15.6 Contracting Market Design -- 15.7 Pricing of Construction Contracts -- 15.7.1 Marginal Cost Decisions Versus Markup Pricing -- 15.7.2 Auctioning -- 15.7.2.1 Construction Goods and Auctions -- 15.7.2.2 Auction Designs -- 15.7.3 Sealed-Bid Auctions -- 15.7.3.1 Pricing in Sealed-Bid Auctions -- 15.7.3.2 Pricing bias -- 15.7.3.3 Information Bias -- 15.7.3.4 Uncertainty Bias -- 15.7.3.5 Technology Advance -- 15.8 Supply and Demand in Construction -- 15.9 The Owner as Monopsonist -- 15.10 Bargaining for the Contract Price -- 15.11 Change Orders and Claims -- 15.12 Summary -- References -- Chapter 16 Market Imperfections -- 16.1 Imperfect Information -- 16.2 Externalities -- 16.3 Collusion and Corruption -- 16.3.1 Collusion -- 16.3.1.1 Naturally Caused Collusion -- 16.3.1.2 Artificially Caused Collusion -- 16.3.2 Corruption -- 16.4 Mechanics or Ethics of Collusion -- 16.5 Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 17 Government -- 17.1 Government as Actor on Markets -- 17.2 Taxes and Subsidies -- 17.3 Regulations -- 17.4 Interest Rates -- 17.5 Inflation -- References -- Chapter 18 Public Goods -- 18.1 Characteristics of Private Goods -- 18.1.1 Rivalry -- 18.1.2 Excludability -- 18.2 Theory of Public Goods -- 18.2.1 Demand of a Public Good Based on Utility -- 18.2.2 Demand for a Public Good Based on Willingness to Pay -- 18.3 Free Riding -- 18.4 Cost-Benefit Analysis. |
18.5 Construction Goods as Public Goods. |
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