Blind oracles : intellectuals and war from Kennan to Kissinger / / Bruce Kuklick

• Record Nr.: UNINA9910790519903321
• Autore: Kuklick Bruce <1941->
• Pubbl/distr/stampa: Princeton, New Jersey : , : Princeton University Press, , [2006]; ©2006
• ISBN: 0-691-12349-7; 1-4008-4946-2
• Edizione: [Course Book]
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (258 p.)
• Classificazione: 15.85
• Disciplina: 327.73
• Soggetti: Intellectuals - Political activity - United States - History - 20th century; United States Foreign relations 1945-1989 Decision making
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Note generali: Description based upon print version of record.
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references and index.
• Nota di contenuto: The social rule of the man of knowledge -- Scientific management and war, 1910-1960 -- Theorists of war, 1945-1953 -- RAND in opposition, 1946-1961 -- Accented and unaccented realism, 1946-1961 -- RAND and the Kennedy administration, 1961-1962 -- Cuba and Nassau, 1962 -- Intellectuals in power, 1961-1966 -- The Kennedy school of government, 1964-1971 -- The Pentagon papers -- Henry Kissinger -- Diplomats on foreign policy, 1976-2001.
• Sommario/riassunto: In this trenchant analysis, historian Bruce Kuklick examines the role of intellectuals in foreign policymaking. He recounts the history of the development of ideas about strategy and foreign policy during a critical period in American history: the era of the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union. The book looks at how the country's foremost thinkers advanced their ideas during this time of United States expansionism, a period that culminated in the Vietnam War and détente with the Soviets. Beginning with George Kennan after World War II, and concluding with Henry Kissinger and the Vietnam War, Kuklick examines the role of both institutional policymakers such as those at The Rand Corporation and Harvard's Kennedy School, and individual thinkers including Paul Nitze, McGeorge Bundy, and Walt Rostow. Kuklick contends that the figures having the most influence on ; American strategy--Kissinger, for example--clearly understood the way politics and the exercise of power affects policymaking. Other brilliant thinkers, on the other hand, often played a minor role, providing, at best, a rationale for policies adopted for political reasons. At a time when the role of the neoconservatives' influence over American foreign policy is a subject of intense debate, this book offers important insight into the function of intellectuals in foreign policymaking.