Regulatory Capture in Banking

• Record Nr.: UNINA9910788699303321
• Pubbl/distr/stampa: Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2006
• ISBN: 1-4623-4275-2; 1-4527-8143-5; 1-283-51665-9; 9786613829108; 1-4519-0830-X
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (25 p.)
• Collana: IMF Working Papers
• Soggetti: Banks and banking - State supervision; Financial institutions - State supervision; Banks and Banking; Financial Risk Management; Business and Financial; Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages; Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation; General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation; Banking; Financial services law & regulation; Economic & financial crises & disasters; Deposit insurance; Financial regulation and supervision; Capital adequacy requirements; Bank regulation; Banks and banking; Crisis management; Financial services industry; Law and legislation; Asset requirements; State supervision; United States
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Note generali: "January 2006."
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references (p. 22-23).
• Nota di contenuto: ""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. SUSCEPTIBILITY OF BANKING REGULATION TO CAPTURE""; ""III. A MODEL OF BANK REGULATION WITH MORAL HAZARD""; ""IV. COMPETITION BETWEEN JURISDICTIONS""; ""V. CONCLUSIONS""; ""REFERENCES""
• Sommario/riassunto: Banks will want to influence the bank regulator to favor their interests, and they typically have the means to do so. It is shown that such "regulatory capture" in banking does not imply ineffectual regulation; a "captured" regulator may impose very tight, costly prudential requirements to reduce negative spillovers of risk-taking by weaker banks. In these circumstances, differences in the regulatory regime across jurisdictions may persist because each adapts its regulations to suit its dominant incumbent institutions.