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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910788524403321 |
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Autore |
Zhou Jianping |
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Titolo |
Reforming Employment Protection Legislation in France / / Jianping Zhou |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2006 |
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ISBN |
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1-4623-4678-2 |
1-4519-9440-0 |
1-282-44804-8 |
9786613821232 |
1-4519-0902-0 |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (29 p.) |
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Collana |
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Soggetti |
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Labor laws and legislation - France - Econometric models |
Industrial laws and legislation - France |
Labor |
Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search |
Demand and Supply of Labor: General |
Labor Contracts |
Labor Demand |
Labour |
income economics |
Unemployment |
Labor markets |
Employment protection |
Unemployment rate |
Job creation |
Labor market |
Manpower policy |
France |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION LEGISLATION (EPL) IN FRANCE""; ""III. LITERATURE REVIEW""; ""IV. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK""; ""V. SIMULATION RESULTS""; ""VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS""; ""REFERENCES"" |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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Over the last 15 years, the reforms of employment protection legislation (EPL) in European countries have mainly eased hiring and firing restrictions for temporary employment while leaving the strict EPL provisions for regular or permanent contracts unchanged. Recent reforms in France follow this pattern. Using a search-matching model, we argue that this type of partial reform is inefficient: easing restrictions on temporary jobs fosters both job creation and job destruction, but strict EPL discourages both. The overall impact on equilibrium unemployment is thus ambiguous, depending on the characteristics of the specific labor market. Simulations of the model, calibrated for the French labor market, suggest that the job destruction effect is stronger, thus raising the unemployment rate. |
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