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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910788523503321 |
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Autore |
Berger Helge |
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Titolo |
Central Bank Boards Around the World : : Why Does Membership Size Differ? / / Helge Berger, Tonny Lybek, Volker Nitsch |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2006 |
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ISBN |
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1-4623-0236-X |
1-4527-8746-8 |
1-282-44792-0 |
1-4519-0994-2 |
9786613821126 |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (48 p.) |
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Collana |
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Altri autori (Persone) |
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Soggetti |
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Banks and banking, Central |
Monetary policy |
Banks and Banking |
Foreign Exchange |
Banks |
Depository Institutions |
Micro Finance Institutions |
Mortgages |
Central Banks and Their Policies |
Banking |
Currency |
Foreign exchange |
Central bank autonomy |
Exchange rate arrangements |
Floating exchange rates |
Central bank organization |
Banks and banking |
United Kingdom |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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At head of title: Monetary and Capital Markets Department. |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references (p. 43-46). |
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Nota di contenuto |
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""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. POSSIBLE DETERMINANTS OF CENTRAL BANK BOARD SIZE""; ""III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS""; ""IV. CONCLUSIONS""; ""APPENDIXES ""; ""REFERENCES"" |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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This paper analyzes empirically differences in the size of central bank boards across countries. Defining a board as the body that changes monetary instruments to achieve a specified target, we discuss the possible determinants of a board's size. The empirical relevance of these factors is examined using a new dataset that covers the de jure membership size of 84 central bank boards at the end of 2003. We find that larger and more heterogeneous countries, countries with stronger democratic institutions, countries with floating exchange rate regimes, and independent central banks with more staff tend to have larger boards. |
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