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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910788521403321 |
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Autore |
Duttagupta Rupa |
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Titolo |
Fiscal Discipline and Exchange Rate Regimes : : Evidence From the Caribbean / / Rupa Duttagupta, Guillermo Tolosa |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2006 |
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ISBN |
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1-4623-9016-1 |
1-4519-8633-5 |
1-282-39212-3 |
9786613820556 |
1-4519-0913-6 |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (37 p.) |
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Collana |
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Altri autori (Persone) |
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Soggetti |
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Fiscal policy - Caribbean Area - Econometric models |
Foreign exchange rates - Caribbean Area - Econometric models |
Exports and Imports |
Foreign Exchange |
Macroeconomics |
Public Finance |
Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy |
Stabilization |
Treasury Policy |
International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions |
Fiscal Policy |
Financial Aspects of Economic Integration |
Currency |
Foreign exchange |
International economics |
Exchange rate arrangements |
Conventional peg |
Fiscal stance |
Fiscal policy |
Monetary unions |
Economic integration |
Antigua and Barbuda |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. FIXED EXCHANGE RATES, CURRENCY UNIONS, AND FISCAL DISCIPLINE""; ""III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS""; ""IV. CONCLUSION""; ""REFERENCES"" |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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This paper assesses the nature of fiscal discipline under alternative exchange rate regimes. First, it shows in a simple theoretical framework that fiscal agencies under a currency union with a fixed exchange rate can have the largest incentive to overspend or "free-ride" (compared to those under other exchange rate regimes) owing to their ability to spread the costs of overspending in terms of the inflation tax across both time-given the fixed exchange rate-and space-given the currency union. In contrast, such free-riding behavior does not arise under flexible regimes owing to the immediate inflationary impact of spending. Next, empirically, it shows that fiscal stances in countries with fixed pegs and currency unions regime demonstrate greater free-riding behavior than countries with more flexible regimes in 15 Caribbean countries during 1983-2004. |
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