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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910788416203321 |
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Autore |
Leruth Luc |
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Titolo |
A Principal-Agent Theory Approach to Public Expenditure Management Systems in Developing Countries / / Luc Leruth, Elisabeth Paul |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2006 |
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ISBN |
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1-4623-8814-0 |
1-4519-8834-6 |
1-283-51214-9 |
1-4519-9323-4 |
9786613824592 |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (45 p.) |
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Collana |
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Altri autori (Persone) |
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Soggetti |
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Government spending policy - Management - Developing countries |
Expenditures, Public - Developing countries |
Public Finance |
Taxation |
Auditing |
Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General |
National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General |
Public Administration |
Public Sector Accounting and Audits |
Management accounting & bookkeeping |
Public finance & taxation |
Expenditure |
External audit |
Internal controls |
Tax incentives |
Expenditures, Public |
Revenue |
France |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. INTERPRETATION OF PEM UNDER THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY""; ""III. THE BASIC MODEL ""; ""IV. EX POST AUDITS""; ""V. EX ANTE CONTROLS""; ""VI. CONCLUSION""; ""REFERENCES"" |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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A well-functioning public expenditure management (PEM) system is considered a critical pillar of government efficiency, on par with a low-distortion tax system and efficient tax administration. The paper discusses PEM systems in developing countries using an analytical framework based on principal-agent theory. This simple model can be applied to various PEM systems, and allows for comparisons between institutional settings. To illustrate this, we analyze the benefits derived from the use by the Ministry of Finance (MoF) of two control instruments; ex post audits and ex ante controls, and assess their value in terms of their ability to deter cheating. We derive a set of possible "control regimes" which can be used by the MoF. Although we illustrate the use of the model using developing countries, it is also relevant to developed economies. |
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