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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910788410903321 |
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Autore |
Crowe Christopher |
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Titolo |
Goal-Independent Central Banks : : Why Politicians Decide to Delegate / / Christopher Crowe |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2006 |
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ISBN |
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1-4623-6291-5 |
1-4527-8242-3 |
1-282-64909-4 |
9786613822901 |
1-4519-0969-1 |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (43 p.) |
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Collana |
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Soggetti |
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Banks and banking, Central |
Monetary policy |
Banks and Banking |
Inflation |
Macroeconomics |
Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models: Cross-Sectional Models |
Spatial Models |
Treatment Effect Models |
Noncooperative Games |
Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior |
Price Level |
Deflation |
Central Banks and Their Policies |
Banks |
Depository Institutions |
Micro Finance Institutions |
Mortgages |
Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions |
Banking |
Central bank autonomy |
Personal income |
Prices |
Central banks |
National accounts |
Banks and banking |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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""Contents""; ""I. Introduction""; ""II. The Model""; ""III. Predictions""; ""IV. Empirical Tests""; ""V. Case Studies""; ""VI. Conclusions"" |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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A motivation for central bank independence (CBI) is that policy delegation helps politicians manage diverse coalitions. This paper develops a model of coalition formation that predicts when delegation will occur. An analysis of policy preferences survey data and CBI indicators supports the predictions. Case studies, drawn from several countries' recent past and the nineteenth-century United States, provide further support. Finally, the model explains why the expected negative relationship between CBI and inflation is not empirically robust: endogenous selection biases the estimated effect towards zero. The data confirm this. |
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