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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910788407403321 |
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Autore |
Estevão Marcello |
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Titolo |
Are the French Happy with the 35-Hour Workweek? / / Marcello Estevão, Filipa Sa |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2006 |
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ISBN |
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1-4623-3869-0 |
1-4527-5618-X |
1-283-51592-X |
1-4519-0964-0 |
9786613828378 |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (26 p.) |
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Collana |
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Altri autori (Persone) |
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Soggetti |
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Hours of labor - France - Econometric models |
Workweek - France - Econometric models |
Labor |
Macroeconomics |
Employment |
Unemployment |
Wages |
Intergenerational Income Distribution |
Aggregate Human Capital |
Aggregate Labor Productivity |
Time Allocation and Labor Supply |
Single Equation Models |
Single Variables: Cross-Sectional Models |
Spatial Models |
Treatment Effect Models |
Labor Economics: General |
Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: General |
Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search |
Aggregate Factor Income Distribution |
Labour |
income economics |
Income |
National accounts |
Labor economics |
Economic theory |
France |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references (p. 24). |
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Nota di contenuto |
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""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND PREVIOUS RESEARCH""; ""III. CONSEQUENCES OF HOURS RESTRICTIONS: THEORY""; ""IV. DATA AND IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY""; ""V. RESULTS""; ""VI. CONCLUSIONS""; ""REFERENCES"" |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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Legally mandated reductions in the workweek can be either a constraint on individuals' choice or a tool to coordinate individuals' preferences for lower work hours. We confront these two hypotheses by studying the consequences of the workweek reduction in France from 39 to 35 hours, which was first applied to large firms in 2000. Using the timing difference by firm size to set up a quasi-experiment and data from the French labor force survey, we show that the law constrained the choice of a significant number of individuals: dual-job holdings increased, some workers in large firms went to small firms where hours were not constrained, and others were replaced by cheaper, unemployed individuals as relative hourly wages increased in large firms. Employment of persons directly affected by the law declined, although the net effect on aggregate employment was not significant. |
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