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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910788343803321 |
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Autore |
Mishra Prachi |
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Titolo |
Do Interest Groups Affect U.S. Immigration Policy? / / Prachi Mishra, Giovanni Facchini, Anna Maria Mayda |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2008 |
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ISBN |
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1-4623-7294-5 |
1-282-84195-5 |
1-4518-7102-3 |
9786612841958 |
1-4527-2889-5 |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (58 pages) : illustrations (some color) |
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Collana |
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IMF Working Papers |
IMF working paper ; ; WP/08/244 |
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Altri autori (Persone) |
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FacchiniGiovanni |
MaydaAnna Maria |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Lobbying - United States - Econometric models |
Labor |
Macroeconomics |
Public Finance |
Emigration and Immigration |
International Migration |
National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General |
Labor Economics: General |
Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search |
Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining: General |
Migration, immigration & emigration |
Public finance & taxation |
Labour |
income economics |
Trade unions |
Migration |
Expenditure |
Unemployment rate |
Labor unions |
Emigration and immigration |
Expenditures, Public |
Labor economics |
Unemployment |
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United States Emigration and immigration Government policy Econometric models |
United States |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references. |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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While anecdotal evidence suggests that interest groups play a key role in shaping immigration policy, there is no systematic empirical analysis of this issue. In this paper, we construct an industry-level dataset for the United States, by combining information on the number of temporary work visas with data on lobbying activity associated with immigration. We find robust evidence that both pro- and anti-immigration interest groups play a statistically significant and economically relevant role in shaping migration across sectors. Barriers to migration are lower in sectors in which business interest groups incur larger lobby expenditures and higher in sectors where labor unions are more important. |
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