1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910788336503321

Autore

Freedman Charles

Titolo

Why Inflation Targeting? / / Charles Freedman, Douglas Laxton

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2009

ISBN

1-4623-4972-2

1-4527-2989-1

1-4518-7233-X

1-282-84306-0

9786612843068

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (27 p.)

Collana

IMF Working Papers

Altri autori (Persone)

LaxtonDouglas

Soggetti

Inflation (Finance)

Anti-inflationary policies

Foreign Exchange

Inflation

Money and Monetary Policy

Economic Theory

Production and Operations Management

Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles: General (includes Measurement and Data)

Price Level

Deflation

Central Banks and Their Policies

Monetary Policy

Macroeconomics: Production

Agriculture: Aggregate Supply and Demand Analysis

Prices

Macroeconomics

Monetary economics

Currency

Foreign exchange

Economic theory & philosophy

Inflation targeting

Conventional peg

Output gap

Supply shocks

Monetary policy

Production



Economic theory

Supply and demand

United Kingdom

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Description based upon print version of record.

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references.

Nota di contenuto

Contents; I. Introduction; II. Cost of Inflation and Boom-Bust Cycles; A. What Are the Costs of High Inflation?; B. Policy Credibility and Boom-Bust Cycles; Figures; 1. United Kingdom Inflation, Unemployment and Policy Credibility; III. Need for A Nominal Anchor; Tables; 1. Inflation Targeting Adoption Dates; IV. What is Inflation Targeting?; V. Two Key Intellectual Roots of Inflation Targeting; A. Absence of Long-Run Trade-Offs; Box 2.1; 1. Six Principles of Inflation Targeting; 2. Output-Inflation Tradeoffs in the Short Run and Long Run

3. IRFs for a Positive Demand Shock Under Good and Bad Monetary Policy4. IRFs for a Positive Supply Shock Under Good and Bad Monetary Policy; 2. Reduced-Form Inflation Equations Under Good and Bad Monetary Policy; B. The Time-Inconsistency Problem; 5. Taylor Output-Inflation Efficiency Frontiers; VI. How Does IT Work?; References

Sommario/riassunto

This is the second chapter of a forthcoming monograph entitled "On Implementing Full-Fledged Inflation-Targeting Regimes: Saying What You Do and Doing What You Say." We begin by discussing the costs of inflation, including their role in generating boom-bust cycles. Following a general discussion of the need for a nominal anchor, we describe a specific type of monetary anchor, the inflation-targeting regime, and its two key intellectual roots-the absence of long-run trade-offs and the time-inconsistency problem. We conclude by providing a brief introduction to the way in which inflation targeting works.