| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1. |
Record Nr. |
UNINA9910788331003321 |
|
|
Autore |
Chakraborty Shankha |
|
|
Titolo |
The Quality of Public Investment / / Shankha Chakraborty, Era Dabla-Norris |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Pubbl/distr/stampa |
|
|
Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2009 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ISBN |
|
1-4623-1238-1 |
1-4527-4502-1 |
1-4518-7301-8 |
9786612843679 |
1-282-84367-2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Descrizione fisica |
|
1 online resource (25 p.) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Collana |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Altri autori (Persone) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Soggetti |
|
Public investments |
Economics |
Infrastructure |
Macroeconomics |
Public Finance |
Criminology |
Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development |
Institutions and Growth |
Bureaucracy |
Administrative Processes in Public Organizations |
Corruption |
National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Infrastructures |
Other Public Investment and Capital Stock |
Investment |
Capital |
Intangible Capital |
Capacity |
Labor Economics: General |
Aggregate Factor Income Distribution |
Public finance & taxation |
Corporate crime |
white-collar crime |
Labour |
income economics |
Public investment and public-private partnerships (PPP) |
Public investment spending |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Labor |
Expenditure |
Crime |
National accounts |
Income |
Public-private sector cooperation |
Saving and investment |
Labor economics |
India |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Lingua di pubblicazione |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
|
|
|
|
|
Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
|
|
|
|
|
Note generali |
|
Description based upon print version of record. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Nota di bibliografia |
|
Includes bibliographical references. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Nota di contenuto |
|
Contents; I. Introduction; Figure 1. Infrastructure Quality vs. Control of Corruption; II. The Environment; III. General Equilibrium; IV. Discussion; A. Micro versus Macro Evidence; Table 1. Effective Output Elasticity of Public Capital; B. Accounting for Income Gaps; Table 2. Ratio of Quality-adjusted Public Capital; Table 3. Steady-State Predictions for Output Gaps; V. Conclusion; Figure 2. Multiple Equilibria in Corruption; References |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Sommario/riassunto |
|
This paper develops a growth model with specialized goods where inefficient and corrupt bureaucracies interact with the provision of public investment services in affecting the productivity of private capital, specialization, and growth. The model provides potential explanations for the contradictory empirical results on the effects of public investment found in the literature as well as for the role of the quality of public infrastructure investment in creating a gap between rich and poor countries. From a policy perspective, the paper suggests that the link between public investment and growth depends critically on the quality and efficiency of public capital. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |