Corporate Governance Reforms in the EU : : Do They Matter and How? / / Iryna Ivaschenko, Petya Brooks

• Record Nr.: UNINA9910788245703321
• Autore: Ivaschenko Iryna
• Pubbl/distr/stampa: Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2008
• ISBN: 1-4623-5075-5; 1-4518-6952-5; 1-282-84046-0; 1-4519-8325-5; 9786612840463
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (31 p.)
• Collana: IMF Working Papers; IMF working paper ; ; WP/08/91
• Altri autori (Persone): BrooksPetya
• Disciplina: 338.6094
• Soggetti: Corporate governance - Europe; Corporate governance; Finance: General; Investments: General; Public Finance; Corporate Governance; Corporate Finance and Governance: Government Policy and Regulation; General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data); Auditing; role & responsibilities of boards & directors; Finance; Management accounting & bookkeeping; Investment & securities; Commodity markets; Capital markets; Securities; Commodity exchanges; Capital market; Financial instruments; Italy
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Note generali: Description based upon print version of record.
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references.
• Nota di contenuto: Contents; I. Introduction; II. National and EU Corporate Governance Reforms; A. National Reforms; B. EU Reforms; III. Measuring the Private Value of Control; IV. Data and Methodology; A. Data Sample and Descriptive Statistics; B. Empirical Strategy; V. Main Findings; A. Voting Premiums Across Time and Countries; B. Have Reforms Reduced the Private Benefits of Control?; C. Have Reforms Brought About Convergence in Corporate Control?; VI. Conclusions; References; Tables; 1. Italy: National Corporate Reform; 2. Germany: National Corporate Governance Reforms; 3. France: National Corporate Governance Reforms4. EU Corporate Governance Reforms; 5. Number of Dual-Class Firms by Country; 6. Voting Premium: Summary Statistics; 7. Voting Premiums Year Effects; 8. Voting Premium Distributed Year Effects; 9. Relative Effectiveness of Reforms in C3 Compared to the EU and Non-EU Peers, by Year; 10. Relative Effectiveness of Reforms Compared to Control Groups: A Summary; 11. Voting Premiums: Year Effects, Accounting for Product Market Reforms; 12. Relative Effectiveness of Reforms in C3 Compared to the EU and Non-EU Peers, Accounting for Product Market Reforms, by Year13. Distribution Characteristics of Voting Premiums, Pooled for All EU Countries; Figures; 1. Dynamic of the Voting Premiums Acorss Countries, 1992-2007; 2. Reform Efforts: Number of Important Corporate Governance Reforms Per Year; 3. Number of National and EU Corporate Governance Reforms; 4. Convergence in Voting Premiums Across Countries; 5. Distribution of Voting Premium Across EU Countries, by Year
• Sommario/riassunto: This paper proposes a new approach to quantifying the effects of corporate governance reforms, by focusing on the dynamics of the voting premiums, a measure of the private benefits of control in a corporation. The results indicate that the reforms have been successful in reducing the voting premiums EU-wide. Moreover, more intense and broad reform efforts (such as introducing national reforms beyond and above the EU-wide initiatives) bring higher and longer lasting benefits. Our findings also suggest that the market for corporate control in Europe has become more integrated, as illustrated by the lower dispersion in voting premiums across countries and over time.

The shadow of the past [[electronic resource] ] : reputation and military alliances before the First World War / / Gregory D. Miller

• Record Nr.: UNINA9910790262303321
• Autore: Miller Gregory D. <1973->
• Pubbl/distr/stampa: Ithaca, : Cornell University Press, 2012
• ISBN: 0-8014-6460-9; 0-8014-6413-7
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (249 p.)
• Collana: Cornell studies in security affairs
• Disciplina: 940.3/112
• Soggetti: Reputation (Law); Alliances; Europe Foreign relations 1871-1918
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Note generali: Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references and index.
• Nota di contenuto: Frontmatter -- Contents -- List of Figures and Tables -- Acknowledgments -- 1. Alliances and Reputation in International Relations -- 2. Reliability and Alliance Behavior -- 3. The End of Splendid Isolation: British Pursuit of an Ally, 1901-1905 -- 4. The First Moroccan Crisis: Testing the Anglo-French Entente, 1904-1907 -- 5. The Bosnia-Herzegovina Crisis: Expanding the Entente, 1907-1911 -- 6. The Agadir Crisis: Rolling toward War, 1910-1914 -- 7. Summary and Expansion of Findings -- Appendixes -- Index
• Sommario/riassunto: In The Shadow of the Past, Gregory D. Miller examines the role that reputation plays in international politics, emphasizing the importance of reliability-confidence that, based on past political actions, a country will make good on its promises-in the formation of military alliances. Challenging recent scholarship that focuses on the importance of credibility-a state's reputation for following through on its threats-Miller finds that reliable states have much greater freedom in forming alliances than those that invest resources in building military force but then use it inconsistently.To explore the formation and maintenance of alliances based on reputation, Miller draws on insights from both political science and business theory to track the evolution of great power relations before the First World War. He starts with the British ; decision to abandon "splendid isolation" in 1900 and examines three crises-the First Moroccan Crisis (1905-6), the Bosnia-Herzegovina Crisis (1908-9), and the Agadir Crisis (1911)-leading up to the war. He determines that states with a reputation for being a reliable ally have an easier time finding other reliable allies, and have greater autonomy within their alliances, than do states with a reputation for unreliability. Further, a history of reliability carries long-term benefits, as states tend not to lose allies even when their reputation declines.