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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910787758203321 |
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Autore |
Steinberg Alexander <1979-> |
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Titolo |
A chance for possibility : an investigation into the grounds of modality / / Alexander Steinberg |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Boston : , : De Gruyter, , [2013] |
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©2013 |
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ISBN |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (276 p.) |
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Collana |
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Philosophische analyse / philosophical analysis ; ; 51 |
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Classificazione |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Modality (Logic) |
Possibility |
Realism |
Supervenience (Philosophy) |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Description based upon print version of record. |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references and index. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Front matter -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- Chapter 1. Introduction -- Chapter 2. Supervenience -- Chapter 3. Concrete Possible Worlds -- Chapter 4. Abstract Possible Worlds -- Chapter 5. Possibility and Probability -- Chapter 6. Conclusion -- Appendix A. Non-Nominal Quantification -- Name Index -- Bibliography |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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A Chance for Possibility defends the view that the objective modal realm is tripartite: truths about possible worlds supervene on modal truths, which in turn supervene on truths about objective chances. An understanding of supervenience in terms of grounding is developed which - unlike the standard modal characterization - allows the question of what modal truths supervene on to have a non-trivial answer. Relying on this understanding, a negative result is established: modal truths do not supervene on truths about possible worlds, whether possible worlds are conceived of as Lewisian concreta or as abstract objects of some kind. Instead, a conception of pleonastic possible worlds is developed that reverses the direction of supervenience. On the basis of linguistic considerations concerning our use of natural language 'might' and 'might have' sentences, Steinberg finally argues that truths about objective chances are able to provide a |
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