1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910456652003321

Autore

Greenberg Elinor

Titolo

Time of our own [[electronic resource] ] : in celebration of women over sixty / / Elinor Miller Greenberg and Fay Wadsworth Whitney

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Golden, Colo., : Fulcrum Pub., c2008

ISBN

1-282-46780-8

9786612467806

1-55591-812-3

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (248 p.)

Altri autori (Persone)

WhitneyFay W

Disciplina

646.7/90820973

Soggetti

Older women - United States

Electronic books.

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Description based upon print version of record.

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references.

Nota di contenuto

Contents; Introduction vii; Chapter 1: The Third Third of Life 1; Chapter 2: The Concept of Reinvention 11; Chapter 3: Changing Roles, Responsibilities,and Relationships 29; Chapter 4: Women and Work 49; Chapter 5: Women and Money 79; Chapter 6: Women and Health 103; Chapter 7: Losses, Regrets, and Gains 137; Chapter 8: From Generation to Generation 165; Chapter 9: From a Room of Our Own to a Time of Our Own 185; Afterword: About Chapter 10 199; Epilogue: "Life Is a Journey" 203; Acknowledgments 205; Appendix A: Interview Guide 207; Appendix B: Health Matters Topics 212

Appendix C: Reliable Health Resources on the Web 213Appendix D: Creating Third-Third Transition Learning Environments 216; Endnotes 221; Resources 226

Sommario/riassunto

The very concept of retirement is changing, especially among women. Today's mature female is a pacesetter, exemplifying a unique approach to work, service, and learning. These women, age 60 and older, find themselves entering the last third of their lives in a state of relative health, optimism, and personal freedom, and are beginning to ask, ""What now?"" Based on extensive interviews, research, and the authors' professional and personal experiences, A Time of Our Own explores the opportunities available in one's ""third third."" A must-read for all



women entering this exciti

2.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910785973403321

Autore

Taylor James Stacey <1970-, >

Titolo

Death, posthumous harm, and bioethics / / James Stacey Taylor

Pubbl/distr/stampa

New York : , : Routledge, , 2012

ISBN

1-136-25775-6

1-283-70926-0

0-203-10642-3

1-136-25776-4

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (243 p.)

Collana

Routledge annals of bioethics ; ; 12

Disciplina

128/.5

Soggetti

Death

Death - Moral and ethical aspects

Respect for persons

Dead

Bioethics

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Description based upon print version of record.

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references (p. 205-221) and index.

Nota di contenuto

Cover; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Acknowledgments; Introduction: Death Unterrible; Full-blooded Epicureanism and Contemporary Bioethics; A Note on Methodology; Outline of this Volume; 1 Posthumous Harm and Interest-based Accounts of Well-being; The Intuitive Case for Posthumous Harm; The Anti-Hedonistic Intuition; Wronging the Dead; The Feinberg-Pitcher Argument for Posthumous Harm; Assessing the Argument for Posthumous Harm; Accommodating Orphaned Intuitions; Accommodating Feinberg's and Parfit's Anti-Hedonistic Intuitions; Can the Dead be Wronged?

Portmore, Posthumous Harm, and the Desire Theory of WelfareConclusion; 2 Further Criticisms of the Possibility of Posthumous Harm; Levenbook's Account of Harm as Loss; Levenbook's Argument; Criticisms of Levenbook's Argument; Grover's Quality of Life Arguments; Grover's Argument; Criticisms of Grover's Argument;



Sperling's Human Subject Account; Sperling's Argument; Criticisms of Sperling's Argument; Harm and Implication in Evil; Conclusion; 3 The Impossibility of Posthumous Harm; Death, Goods, and the Extinction of Desires; Responding to Luper; Towards Hedonism; Objects and Causes

Conclusion4 Can the Dead Be Wronged?; Desert and Injustice; Blustein and the "Dear Departed"; Responses to Blustein's Arguments; Response to the Rescue from Insignificance Argument; Response to the Enduring Duties Argument; Response to the Reciprocity Argument; Rights and Interests; Conclusion; 5 Why Death Is Not a Harm to the One Who Dies; The Epicurean Argument; Hedonism Revisited; Death and Deprivation; Does a Person's Death Deprive Her of the Goods of Life?; Responses to these Deprivation-based Arguments for the Harm of Death; The Existence Variant and Presentism Defended; Conclusion

6 Fearless SymmetryLucretian Arguments; Challenges to the Lucretian Symmetry Argument; Responses to Nagel's Objection; Stoic fate; Hetherington's Symmetry Arguments; Earlier Birth and Personal Identity; Kaufman's Defense of Nagel's Argument; Responses to Kaufman; Responses to the Other Criticisms of this Lucretian Argument; The Backfire Problem; Feldman's Objection; Parfit's Hospital Example; Conclusion; 7 Epicureanism, Suicide, and Euthanasia; McMahan's Reconciliation Strategy; An Epicurean Approach to Suicide and Euthanasia; Suicide; Euthanasia; Conclusion

8 Epicureanism and Organ ProcurementEpicureanism and Policies of Presumed Consent; Presumed Consent and the "Fewer Mistakes" Arguments; Autonomy-based "Fewer Mistakes" Arguments; Gill's Arguments; Why Gill's Argument against the Qualitative "Fewer Mistakes" Argument Fails; Objections to Gill's Quantitative Autonomy-based "Fewer Mistakes" Argument; The "Fewer Mistakes" Arguments and Violations of Autonomy; Presumed Consent and Respect for Autonomy; From Presumed Consent to Organ Taking; The Standard Pro-Taking Argument; Two Unjustified Assumptions-Moving Towards Markets

The Ownership of Organs

Sommario/riassunto

Death, Posthumous Harm, and Bioethics offers a highly distinctive and original approach to the metaphysics of death and applies this approach to contemporary debates in bioethics that address end-of-life and post-mortem issues. Taylor defends the controversial Epicurean view that death is not a harm to the person who dies and the neo-Epicurean thesis that persons cannot be affected by events that occur after their deaths, and hence that posthumous harms (and benefits) are impossible. He then extends this argument by asserting that the dead cannot be wronged, finally presenting a de