1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910785960703321

Autore

Pardey U

Titolo

Frege on Absolute and Relative Truth [[electronic resource] ] : An Introduction to the Practice of Interpreting Philosophical Texts / / by U. Pardey

Pubbl/distr/stampa

London : , : Palgrave Macmillan UK : , : Imprint : Palgrave Macmillan, , 2012

ISBN

1-283-73715-9

1-137-01223-4

Edizione

[1st ed. 2012.]

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (267 p.)

Collana

History of Analytic Philosophy, , 2634-5994

Disciplina

121

Soggetti

Mathematics—Philosophy

Philosophy

Language and languages—Philosophy

Modern philosophy

Logic

Analysis (Philosophy)

Philosophy of Mathematics

History of Philosophy

Philosophy of Language

Modern Philosophy

Analytic Philosophy

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Description based upon print version of record.

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Nota di contenuto

Cover; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Series Editor's Preface; Preface; Acknowledgments; Texts and Translations; List of Logical Symbols; 1 Introduction: In Tarski's Shadow; 1.1 Frege's critique of the correspondence theory; 1.2 Six incredible errors; 2 The Context: The Question of Truth Bearers; 2.1 Psychologism - Frege's major target; 2.2 Relative and absolute truth; 2.3 Excursion: relativizations of truth; 2.4 Regions of truth; 2.5 Two notions of truth; 2.6 The truth of pictures and ideas in terms of correspondence; 3 Frege's Text and Its Argumentative Structure; 3.1 The text


3.2 Discussion of the structure: demarcating the arguments3.3 Three definitions of I-truth in terms of correspondence; 4 The First Argument: Scientific Truth Is Absolute; 4.1 The text; 4.2 The absoluteness of scientific truth; 4.3 Soames's and Künne's criticisms of Frege's first argument; 5 The Second Argument: Scientific Truth Is Perfect; 5.1 The text; 5.2 The perfection of scientific truth; 5.3 Soames's reconstruction of the second argument; 5.4 Stuhlmann-Laeisz's critique; 6 The Third Argument: Scientific Truth Is Independent; 6.1 The text

6.2 The connection between the second and third arguments6.3 The dependency of I-truth; 6.4 The omnipresence of truth and Dummett's alleged regress; 6.5 The distinction between I-truth and S-truth; 6.6 The independence of scientific truth; 6.7 The game and its potential restart; 6.8 The connections between the first three arguments; 7 Parallels in Frege's 'Logik'; 7.1 Similarities between the parallel arguments; 7.2 The connection between the two arguments; 7.3 Differences between the definitions; 7.4 Proof structure of the arguments; 7.5 The error in the circle objection in 'Logik'

7.6 The transition from 'Logik' to 'Der Gedanke'7.7 The respective contexts in 'Logik' and in 'Der Gedanke'; 7.8 Concluding comparison of L and G; 7.9 The treadmill; 8 The Fourth Argument: The Circle Objection; 8.1 The text; 8.2 An analytic definition with two one-place predicates; 8.3 The inapplicability of the circle objection to a non-analytic definition; 8.4 Künne's critique; 8.5 A generalization of the circle objection; 9 The Omnipresence of Truth; 9.1 The circle in the application process; 9.2 Propositional questions (1); 9.3 Decisions and applications; 9.4 Propositional questions (2)

9.5 The form of assertive sentences10 Dummett's Regress; 10.1 Dummett's reconstruction and critique of Frege's arguments; 10.2 Dummett's and Soames's neglect of Frege's definitions; 10.3 Dummett's way of connecting the third and fourth objections; 10.4 Dummett's regress as a beginner's mistake; 11 The Reduction of I-Truth to S-Truth; 11.1 The text; 11.2 True ideas and true friends; 11.3 The reduction of I-truth to sentence truth; 11.4 The relativity of sentence truth; 11.5 The truth we really mean; 11.6 The answer to the initial question; 12 The Fifth Argument: Frege's Regress; 12.1 The text

12.2 The regress argument

Sommario/riassunto

This book has two objectives: to be a contribution to the understanding of Frege's theory of truth – especially a defence of his notorious critique of the correspondence theory - and to be an introduction to the practice of interpreting philosophical texts.