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1. |
Record Nr. |
UNINA9910219973703321 |
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Autore |
Gompert David C. |
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Titolo |
Blinders, blunders, and wars : what America and China can learn / / David C. Gompert, Hans Binnendijk, Bonny Lin |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Santa Monica, California : , : RAND, , 2014 |
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©2014 |
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ISBN |
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0-8330-8778-9 |
0-8330-8780-0 |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (601 p.) |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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War - Decision making |
Strategy |
Military history |
United States Military policy Decision making |
China Military policy Decision making |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Description based upon print version of record. |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Cover; Title Page; Copyright; Preface; Contents; Figures and Tables; Summary; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; CHAPTER ONE: Introduction; Blunders; A Brief History of Blunders; Strategic Decisionmaking; Models of Reality; Blunders and Information; Structure of the Study; Conclusion; CHAPTER TWO: The Information Value Chain and the Use of Information for Strategic Decisionmaking; The Role of Information in War and Peace; The Information Value Chain; Information and Strategic Blunders; Technology and the Information Value Chain; Individuals and Institutions in the Information Value Chain |
Road MapCHAPTER THREE: Napoleon's Invasion of Russia, 1812; Man of Destiny; The Russia Problem; Planning for the Best; Hunger, Cold, and Cossacks; Flawed Model of Reality; He Could Have Known Better; CHAPTER FOUR: The American Decision to Go to War with Spain, 1898; Looking for the Right War; Late Nineteenth-Century America and Its Ambitions; The War with Great Britain That Wasn't; Targeting Spain; The Decision; The Results; The Decisionmaking and What to Learn from It; CHAPTER FIVE: Germany's Decision to Conduct Unrestricted U-boat |
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Warfare, 1916; Germany's Dilemma; Kaiser in a Corner |
The Military Prevails-Germany LosesWhy Were the Risks Minimized?; The Worst of All Options; CHAPTER SIX: Woodrow Wilson's Decision to Enter World War I, 1917; Ending American Neutrality; Wilson Hesitates, Maneuvers, Then Decides; Realism and Idealism; Reluctant but Right; CHAPTER SEVEN: Hitler's Decision to Invade the USSR, 1941; Hitler's Momentous Mistake; Reversing Defeat and Gazing to the East; The Decision for Operation Barbarossa; From Victory to Defeat; Understanding Hitler and His Environment; A Flawed Theory of Success; Conclusion; CHAPTER EIGHT: Japan's Attack on Pearl Harbor, 1941 |
Imperial Japan Colonizes ChinaU.S. Backlash; Fateful Decision; Moves Toward War; Decisionmaking in Tokyo; Pyrrhic Victory; Japan's Flawed Model of Success; Conclusion; CHAPTER NINE: U.S.-Soviet Showdown over the Egyptian Third Army, 1973; The Makings of U.S.-Soviet Confrontation; The Fate of the Third Army; Anatomy of Decision; Success; Getting It Right; CHAPTER TEN: China's Punitive War Against Vietnam, 1979; Mitigated Blunder; The Road to War; The Decision to Punish Vietnam; Assessing the War; Deng as Decisionmaker; CHAPTER ELEVEN: The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, 1979 |
The Beginning of the EndMonumental Mistake; Mission Creep, Soviet Style; What Were They Thinking?; Failure to Imagine What Would Happen; CHAPTER TWELVE: The Soviet Decision Not to Invade Poland, 1981; Counterrevolution in Poland; From a Reluctant Yes to a Maybe to an Adamant No; Conversion on the Road to Warsaw; The Days and Years to Follow; Were the Soviets Thinking Straight?; Lessons for Strategic Decisionmaking; CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Argentina's Invasion of the Falklands (Malvinas), 1982; As Bad as a Blunder Can Be; Argentine Fury and Folly; In a Trap of Their Own Making; Unhinged from Reality |
Rational but Wrong |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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The history of wars caused by misjudgments, from Napoleon's invasion of Russia to America's invasion of Iraq, reveals that leaders relied on cognitive models that were seriously at odds with objective reality. Blinders, Blunders, and Wars analyzes eight historical examples of strategic blunders regarding war and peace and four examples of decisions that turned out well, and then applies those lessons to the current Sino-American case. |
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2. |
Record Nr. |
UNINA9910784665203321 |
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Autore |
Barnouw Dagmar |
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Titolo |
The war in the empty air : victims, perpetrators, and postwar Germans / / Dagmar Barnouw |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Bloomington : , : Indiana University Press, , 2005 |
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©2005 |
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ISBN |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (xiv, 303 pages) |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Collective memory - Germany |
World War, 1939-1945 - Germany - Historiography |
Photography in historiography |
National characteristics, German |
History - Psychological aspects |
Germany History 1933-1945 Historiography |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references (p. [261]-295) and index. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Contents; Preface: The Loss of History in Postwar German Memory; 1. Historical Memory and the Uses of Remorse; 2. ""Their Monstrous Past"": German Wartime Fictions; 3. Censored Memories:""Are the Germans Victims or Perpetrators?""; 4. The War in the Empty Air: A Moral History of Destruction; 5. No End to ""Auschwitz"": Historical or Redemptive Memory; 6. This Side of Good and Evil: A German Story; Notes; Index |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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"This book will provoke intellectually, ideologically, and emotionally loaded responses in the U.S., Germany, and Israel. Barnouw's critique of the 'enduringly narrow post-Holocaust perspective on German guilt and the ensuing fixation on German remorse' questions taboos that the political and cultural elites in those three countries would rather leave alone ... [Barnouw] makes us understand why the maintenance of a privileged memory of the Nazi period and World War II may not survive much longer." |
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