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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910784562603321 |
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Autore |
Krishna Vijay |
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Titolo |
Auction theory [[electronic resource] /] / Vijay Krishna |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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San Diego, : Academic Press, c2002 |
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ISBN |
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1-281-05230-2 |
9786611052300 |
0-08-047596-5 |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (318 p.) |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Auctions - Mathematical models |
Game theory |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Description based upon print version of record. |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references (p. [289]-297) and index. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Auction Theory; Contents; Preface; Chapter 1: Introduction; Part I: Single Object Auctions; Chapter 2: Private Value Auctions: A First Look; Chapter 3: The Revenue Equivalence Principle; Chapter 4: Qualifications and Extensions; Chapter 5: Mechanism Design; Chapter 6: Auctions with Interdependent Values; Chapter 7: The Revenue Ranking (""Linkage"") Principle; Chapter 8: Asymmetries and Other Complications; Chapter 9: Efficiency and the English Auction; Chapter 10: Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values; Chapter 11: Bidding Rings; Part II: Multiple Object Auctions |
Chapter 12: An Introduction to Multiple Object AuctionsChapter 13: Equilibrium and Efficiency with Private Values; Chapter 14: Some Revenue Considerations; Chapter 15: Sequential Sales; Chapter 16: Nonidentical Objects; Chapter 17: Multiple Objects and Interdependent Values; Part III: Appendices; Appendix A: Continuous Distributions; Appendix B: Stochastic Orders; Appendix C: Order Statistics; Appendix D: Affiliated Random Variables; Appendix E: Some Linear Algebra; Appendix F: Games of Incomplete Information; Appendix G: Existence of Equilibrium in First-Price Auctions; References; Index |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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Through accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory, Vijay Krishna explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information. His results on bidding strategies, |
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