1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910784320603321

Autore

Thatcher Mark

Titolo

The Politics of Delegation

Pubbl/distr/stampa

New York, : Routledge, June 2004

Ipswich, : Ebsco Publishing [distributor]

ISBN

1-135-76896-X

1-135-76897-8

1-280-22435-5

9786610224357

0-203-00598-8

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (249 p.)

Disciplina

320.44/04

Soggetti

Delegation of powers - Europe

Representative government and representation - Europe

Legitimacy of governments - Europe

Delegation of powers - United States

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Description based upon print version of record.

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Nota di contenuto

THE POLITICS OF DELEGATION; Copyright; Content; Foreword; Theory and Practice of Delegation to Non-Majoritarian Institutions; Delegation to Supranational Institutions: Why, How, and with What Consequences?; Rational Fictions: Central Bank Independence and the Social Logic of Delegation; Constitutional Courts and Parliamentary Democracy; Institutional Choice and Bureaucratic Autonomy in Germany; Delegation to Independent Regulatory Agencies: Pressures, Functions and Contextual Mediation; The Unanticipated Consequences of Creating Independent Competition Agencies

Judicial Delegation Doctrines: The US, Britain, and FranceLearning from the Americanists (Again): Theory and Method in the Study of Delegation; Abstracts; Notes on Contributors; Index

Sommario/riassunto

There is a growing interest in delegation to non-majoritarian institutions in Europe, following both the spread of principal-agent theory in political science and law and increasing delegation in practice.



During the 1980s and 1990s, governments and parliaments in West European nations have delegated powers and functions to non-majoritarian bodies - the EU, independent central banks, constitutional courts and independent regulatory agencies. Whereas elected policymakers had been increasing their roles over several decades, delegation involves a remarkable reversal or at least transformation of