1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910783981103321

Autore

Sugiyama Chūhei <1921-1999.>

Titolo

Origins of economic thought in modern Japan [[electronic resource] /] / Chuhei Sugiyama

Pubbl/distr/stampa

London ; ; New York, : Routledge, 1994

ISBN

1-134-88505-9

1-280-11442-8

0-203-99485-X

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (150 p.)

Disciplina

305.8957052

330.0952

330.952

Soggetti

Economics - Japan - History

Japan Economic policy

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Description based upon print version of record.

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references (p. 134-137) and index.

Nota di contenuto

Cover; ORIGINS OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT IN MODERN JAPAN; Title Page; Copyright Page; Table of Contents; Preface; Acknowledgements; 1 THE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT IN MEIJI JAPAN; 2 THE ECONOMIC THOUGHT OF NISHI AMANE; 3 THE ECONOMIC THOUGHT OF TSUDA MAMICHI; 4 THE ECONOMIC THOUGHT OF FUKUZAWA YUKICHI; 5 THE BIRTH OF BUSINESS EDUCATION; 6 THE BIRTH OF A LIMITED COMPANY; 7 THE BIRTH OF ECONOMIC JOURNALISM; 8 PROTECTIONISTS ON THE OFFENSIVE; 9 THE IMPERIAL CONSTITUTION; Appendix Enlightenment by translation: Fukuzawa as a translator; Notes; Bibliography; Index

Sommario/riassunto

By throwing light on economic thought in the period of the Japanese Enlightenment, this book will make clear what led to the institutionalization of business and economic education, the birth of the pioneer business enterprise and of serious economic journalism and the reasons behind the success of Japanese economic development.



2.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910957395003321

Autore

Annen Kurt

Titolo

Donor Competition for Aid Impact, and Aid Fragmentation / / Kurt Annen, Luc Moers

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2012

ISBN

9781475520217

1475520212

9781475539240

147553924X

Edizione

[1st ed.]

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (38 p.)

Collana

IMF Working Papers

Altri autori (Persone)

MoersLuc

Disciplina

337

Soggetti

Economic assistance

Flow of funds

Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General

Budget planning and preparation

Budget Systems

Budget

Budgeting & financial management

Budgeting

Competition

Exports and Imports

Finance

Finance: General

Financial markets

Foreign Aid

Foreign aid

General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data)

Government Policy

International economics

International Fiscal Issues

International Public Goods

International relief

National Budget

Poverty & precarity

Poverty and Homelessness

Poverty reduction

Poverty

Provision and Effects of Welfare Program



Public financial management (PFM)

Social Services and Welfare

Social welfare & social services

Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty: General

China, People's Republic of

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Description based upon print version of record.

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references.

Nota di contenuto

Cover; Contents; 1 Introduction; 2 Donor Coordination in Practice: Fragmentation; Figures; 1 Number of Recipient Countries and Global Aid Budget Shares; 2 Global Aid Herfindahl Index; 3 Background Literature; 4 Model; 4.1 Donors Maximize Net Aid Impact; 4.2 Donors Maximize Relative Net Aid Impact; 3 Best-Response Functions with Identical Donors; 4.3 Introducing Fixed Costs; 4 Best-Response Functions with Non-Identical Donors; 4.4 Introducing More Recipients and More Donors; 5 Empirical Evidence; Tables; 1 Larger Donors vs. Smaller Donors; 5 Herfindahl Index and Relative Donor Size

2 Donor Ranking in Aid Selectivity3 Donor Selectivity and Herfindahl Index; 6 Conclusion; References; Appendix A; Proof of Proposition 1; Description of Best-Response Functions; Proof of Proposition 4; Appendix B; Table 4: Donor Selectivity and MLD; Table 5: Donor Selectivity and Theil Index

Sommario/riassunto

This paper shows that donors that maximize relative aid impact spread their budgets across many recipient countries in a unique Nash equilibrium, explaining aid fragmentation. This equilibrium may be inefficient even without fixed costs, and the inefficiency increases in the equality of donors  budgets. The paper presents empirical evidence consistent with theoretical results. These imply that, short of ending donors maximization of relative aid impact, agreements to better coordinate aid allocations are not implementable. Moreover, since policies to increase donor competition in terms of aid effectiveness risk reinforcing relativeness, they may well backfire, as any such reinforcement increases aid fragmentation.