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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910782843203321 |
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Titolo |
The Economic theory of agrarian institutions / / edited by Pranab Bardhan |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Oxford [England], : Clarendon Press |
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New York, : Oxford University Press, 1989 |
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ISBN |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (417 p.) |
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Collana |
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Altri autori (Persone) |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Agriculture - Economic aspects - Developing countries |
BUSINESS & ECONOMICS |
Industries / Agribusiness |
Business & Economics |
Agricultural Economics |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Intro -- Contents -- Contributors -- I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION -- 1. Alternative Approaches to the Theory of Institutions in Economic Development -- 2. Rational Peasants, Efficient Institutions, and a Theory of Rural Organization: Methodological Remarks for Development Economics -- II. LAND AND LABOUR -- 3. Theories of Sharecropping -- 4. A Comparison of Principal-Agent and Bargaining Solutions: The Case of Tenancy Contracts -- 5. Contracts with Eviction in Infinitely Repeated Principal-Agent Relationships -- 6. Production Relations in Semi-arid African Agriculture -- III. CREDIT AND INTERLINKED TRANSACTIONS -- 7. Rural Credit Markets: The Structure of Interest Rates, Exploitation, and Efficiency -- 8. Credit and Agrarian Class Structure -- 9. Credit Rationing, Tenancy, Productivity, and the Dynamics of Inequality -- 10. On Choice among Creditors and Bonded Labour Contracts -- 11.Some Aspects of Linked Product and Credit Market Contracts among Risk-neutral Agents -- 12. A Note on Interlinked Rural Economic Arrangements -- 13. Interlinkages and the Pattern of Competition -- IV. MARKETING AND INSURANCE -- 14. Agricultural Institutions for Insurance and Stabilization -- 15. Peasants' |
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Risk Aversion and the Choice of Marketing Intermediaries and Contracts: A Bargaining Theory of Equilibrium Marketing Contracts -- V. CO-OPERATIVES, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE STATE -- 16. Agricultural Producer Co-operatives -- 17. Institutional Analysis of Credit Co-operatives -- 18. Agrarian Structure, Technological Innovations, and the State -- Bibliography -- Index. |
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