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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910782510403321 |
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Autore |
Grofman Bernard |
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Titolo |
The Federalist Papers and the New Institutionalism [[electronic resource]] |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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New York, : Algora Publishing, 2007 |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource (296 p.) |
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Disciplina |
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328.730734 |
328.73'0734-dc19 |
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Soggetti |
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Representative government and representation |
Social choice |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Description based upon print version of record. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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CONTENTS; List of Tables and Figures; About the Editors; About the Contributors; Preface; The Federalist Papers and the New Institutionalism: An Overview; Part I. The Madisonian Vision and the Theory of Public Choice: Comparisons and Contrasts; Introduction; 1. Madison's Theory of Representation; 2. Publius and Public Choice; 3. Electoral Institutions in The Federalist Papers: A Contemporary Perspective; 4. Restraining the Whims and Passions of the Public; Part II. Optimal Institutions; Introduction |
5. The Constitution as an Optimal Social Contract: A Transaction Cost Analysis of The Federalist Papers6. Stability and Efficiency in a Separation-of-Powers Constitutional System; 7. Why A Constitution?; Part III. Power: Checks and Balances; Introduction; 8. Are the Two Houses of Congress Really Coequal?; 9. Assessing the Power of the Supreme Court; 10. Checks, Balances, and Bureaucratic Usurpation of Congressional Power; 11. The Distribution of Power in the Federal Government: Perspectives from The Federalist Papers - A Critique; Part IV. The Ratification Debate; Introduction |
12. Public Choice Analysis and the Ratification of the Constitution13. Constitutional Conflict in State and Nation; 14. The Strategy of Ratification; References; Index |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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The Madisonian approach to institutional design, as set forth in The Federalist Papers, is examined from the point of view of leading |
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theorists of the ""public choice"" school who see themselves as the political heirs of that earlier legacy.Bernard Grofman taught a course on representation in which the readings included both the Federalist Papers and Buchanan and Tullock s Calculus of Consent. In teaching that course (and, as he writes, forcing himself to reread the Federalist carefully for the first time since his own graduate student days), his admiration for its authors, already high, grew |
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