1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910782339203321

Autore

Pickavé Martin

Titolo

Heinrich von Gent über Metaphysik als erste Wissenschaft [[electronic resource] ] : Studien zu einem Metaphysikentwurf aus dem letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts / / Martin Pickavé

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Leiden ; ; Boston, : Brill, 2007

ISBN

1-281-91713-3

9786611917135

90-474-1907-3

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (416 p.)

Collana

Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, , 0169-8028 ; ; Bd. 91

Classificazione

08.22

Disciplina

189/.4

Soggetti

Metaphysics

Lingua di pubblicazione

Tedesco

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Revision of the author's thesis--Cologne, 2003.

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references (p. [375]-393) and indexes.

Nota di contenuto

Vorläufige Material / M. Pickavé -- Einleitung / M. Pickavé -- Kapitel I. \'Natürliches\' Wissen Und Die Reichweite Der Menschlichen Vernunft / M. Pickavé -- Kapitel II. Der Gegenstand Der Metaphysik / M. Pickavé -- Kapitel III. Seiendes Als Ersterkanntes Des Menschlichen Intellekts / M. Pickavé -- Kapitel IV. Seiendes Und Sache / M. Pickavé -- Kapitel V. Die Lehre Von Den Transzendentalen Eigenschaften Des Seienden / M. Pickavé -- Kapitel VI. Philosophische Gotteserkenntnis / M. Pickavé -- Konklusion / M. Pickavé -- Appendix: Zur Authentizität Des Metaphysikkommentars In Ms. Escorial H. II. 1 / M. Pickavé -- Bibliographie / M. Pickavé -- Register / M. Pickavé.

Sommario/riassunto

The last 30 years have seen a revived interest in Henry of Ghent, one of the leading theologians at the University of Paris in the last quarter of the 13th century. This volume offers a new and comprehensive study of a central aspect of Henry’s philosophical thought: his understanding of metaphysics. The study examines why, according to Henry, there has to be a science investigating being qua being and how such an inquiry is at all possible. In Henry’s conception, metaphysics is not just one scientific discipline among others but the first and fundamental one for it deals with the first object of the intellect as its subject-matter. The recognition of this understanding, as the present study intends to



show, opens a new perspective on the proper philosophical dimension of Henry of Ghent’s thought.