Constitutional courts and democratic values [[electronic resource] ] : a European perspective / / Víctor Ferreres Comella

• Record Nr.: UNINA9910780429403321
• Autore: Ferreres Comella Víctor
• Pubbl/distr/stampa: New Haven ; ; London, : Yale University Press, c2009
• ISBN: 1-282-35279-2; 9786612352799; 0-300-14868-2
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (1 online resource (xvi, 238 p.))
• Disciplina: 347.4035
• Soggetti: Constitutional courts - Europe; Constitutional courts - United States; Judicial review - Europe; Judicial review - United States
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Note generali: Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references (p. 159-222) and index.
• Nota di contenuto: Frontmatter -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- 1. The Rise of Constitutional Courts -- 2. Historical Background: The Principle of Separation of Powers -- 3. A Traditional Justification: Legal Certainty -- 4. The Justification of Constitutional Review: The Sketch of an Argument -- 5. The Special Nature of Constitutional Discourse -- 6. The Structure of the Constitutional Conversation -- 7. Overcoming Judicial Timidity -- 8. The Democratic Objection to Constitutional Review -- 9. Democratic Checks on Courts -- 10. Decentralizing Tendencies in the System -- 11. The Impact of the European Court of Justice -- 12. The Impact of the European Court of Human Rights -- Afterword -- Notes -- Index
• Sommario/riassunto: In this book, Víctor Ferreres Comella contrasts the European "centralized" constitutional court model, in which one court system is used to adjudicate constitutional questions, with a decentralized model, such as that of the United States, in which courts deal with both constitutional and nonconstitutional questions. Comella's systematic exploration of the reasons for and against the creation of constitutional courts is rich in detail and offers an ambitious theory to justify the ; European preference for them. Based on extensive research on eighteen European countries, Comella finds that centralized review fits well with the civil law tradition and structures of ordinary adjudication in those countries. Comella concludes that-while the decentralized model works for the United States-there is more than one way to preserve democratic values and that these values are best preserved in the parliamentary democracies of Europe through constitutional courts.