Strategic foundations of general equilibrium : dynamic matching and bargaining games / / Douglas Gale [[electronic resource]]

• Record Nr.: UNINA9910780089503321
• Autore: Gale Douglas
• Pubbl/distr/stampa: Cambridge : , : Cambridge University Press, , 2000
• ISBN: 1-107-11659-7; 0-511-49231-6; 0-511-31101-X; 1-280-15376-8; 0-511-05188-3; 0-511-11744-2; 0-521-64330-9; 0-511-15224-8
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (xi, 219 pages) : digital, PDF file(s)
• Collana: Churchill lectures in economics
• Disciplina: 338.6/048/015193
• Soggetti: Competition; Equilibrium (Economics); Game theory
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Note generali: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references (p. 208-213) and index.
• Nota di contenuto: Markets and games -- Strategic foundations of perfect competition -- Why strategic foundations? -- Cooperative market games -- Non-cooperative market games -- Dynamic matching and bargaining models -- Open questions -- Perfect competition -- Pure exchange economics -- Dynamic matching and bargaining games -- Equilibrium -- The Edgeworth Property -- Efficiency -- Competitive sequences of economies -- Existence -- Efficiency with discounting -- Random matching -- Mixed equilibria -- A summing up -- Continuity and anonymity -- Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990) -- Bounded rationality and uniqueness -- The Limit Principle -- Repeated games -- Limited memory -- Large anonymous games -- Non-anonymous games -- Bounded rationality -- Imitation and experimentation -- A behavioral model of competition -- Convergence to competitive prices -- ; Extensions.
• Sommario/riassunto: The theory of competition has held a central place in economic analysis since Adam Smith. This book, written by one of the most distinguished of contemporary economic theorists, reports on a major research program to provide strategic foundations for the theory of perfect competition. Beginning with a concise survey of how the theory of competition has evolved, Gale makes extensive and rigorous use of dynamic matching and bargaining models to provide a more complete description of how a competitive equlibrium is achieved. Whereas economists have made use of a macroscopic description of markets in which certain behavioral characteristics, such as price-taking behavior, are taken for granted, Gale uses game theory to re-evaluate this assumption, beginning with individual agents and modelling their strategic interaction. A strategic foundation for competitive equilibrium shows how such interaction leads to competitive, price-taking behavior. Essential reading for graduate courses in game theory and general equilibrium.