Coordinating Climate and Trade Policies : : Pareto Efficiency and the Role of Border Tax Adjustments / / Michael Keen, Christos Kotsogiannis

• Record Nr.: UNINA9910779641303321
• Autore: Keen Michael
• Pubbl/distr/stampa: Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2012
• ISBN: 1-4755-1485-9; 1-4755-2046-8
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (27 p.)
• Collana: IMF Working Papers
• Altri autori (Persone): KotsogiannisChristos
• Soggetti: Climatic changes - Government policy; Commercial policy - Environmental aspects; Taxation - Environmental aspects; Taxation; Environmental Economics; Environmental Policy; Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General; Trade and Environment; Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies; Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations; Business Taxes and Subsidies; Environmental Economics: General; Environmental Economics: Government Policy; Public finance & taxation; Environmental economics; Environmental policy & protocols; Carbon tax; Tariffs; Value-added tax; Emissions trading; Climate policy; Taxes; Environment; Environmental impact charges; Tariff; Spendings tax; Environmental policy; United States
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Note generali: Description based upon print version of record.
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references.
• Nota di contenuto: Cover; Contents; I. Introduction; II. Modeling Climate and Trade Policies; III. The Benchmark: Unconstrained Carbon Tax and Tariff Policies; IV. Pareto Efficiency and the Role of Border Tax Adjustments; A. Border Tax Adjustments in the Absence of Distributional Concerns; B. Border Tax Adjustments in the General Case; V. Further Discussion; A. Comparison with Non-cooperative Policies; B. Border Tax Adjustment and Cap-and-Trade; VI. Concluding Remarks; Appendices; A. Necessary Conditions for Pareto Efficiency; B. Proof of Proposition 1; C. Proof of Proposition 2; D. Proof of Proposition 5; References
• Sommario/riassunto: This paper explores the role of trade instruments in globally efficient climate policies, focusing on the central issue of whether some form of border tax adjustment (BTA) is warranted when carbon prices differ internationally. It shows that tariff policy has a role in easing cross-country distributional concerns that can make non-uniform carbon pricing efficient and, more particularly, that Pareto-efficiency requires a form of BTA when carbon taxes in some countries are constrained, a special case being identified in which this has the simple structure envisaged in practical policy discusions. It also stresses—a point that has been overlooked in the policy debate—that the efficiency case for BTA depends critically on whether climate policies are pursued by carbon taxation or by cap-and-trade.