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Record Nr. |
UNINA9910779296803321 |
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Autore |
Larsson Tomas <1966-> |
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Titolo |
Land and loyalty [[electronic resource] ] : security and the development of property rights in Thailand / / Tomas Larsson |
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Pubbl/distr/stampa |
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Ithaca, : Cornell University Press, 2012 |
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ISBN |
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0-8014-6455-2 |
0-8014-6408-0 |
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Descrizione fisica |
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1 online resource : illustrations (black and white) |
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Collana |
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Cornell studies in political economy |
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Disciplina |
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Soggetti |
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Land tenure - Economic aspects - Thailand |
Economic development - Thailand |
Capitalism - Thailand |
Thailand Economic policy |
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Lingua di pubblicazione |
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Formato |
Materiale a stampa |
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Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
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Note generali |
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Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph |
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Nota di bibliografia |
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Includes bibliographical references and index. |
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Nota di contenuto |
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Frontmatter -- Contents -- List of Figures and Tables -- Acknowledgments -- 1. Securitization and Institutional Development -- 2. Capitalizing Thailand -- 3. Weapon of a Weak State -- 4. Conserving Smallholder Society -- 5. Combating Specters and Communists -- 6. Old Solutions, New Challenges -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index |
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Sommario/riassunto |
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Domestic and international development strategies often focus on private ownership as a crucial anchor for long-term investment; the security of property rights provides a foundation for capitalist expansion. In recent years, Thailand's policies have been hailed as a prime example of how granting formal land rights to poor farmers in low-income countries can result in economic benefits. But the country provides a puzzle: Thailand faced major security threats from colonial powers in the nineteenth century and from communism in the twentieth century, yet only in the latter case did the government respond with pro-development tactics.In Land and Loyalty, Tomas Larsson argues that institutional underdevelopment may prove, under certain circumstances, a strategic advantage rather than a weakness and that external threats play an important role in shaping the development of property regimes. Security concerns, he find, often |
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