1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910779004003321

Autore

Moosbrugger Lorelei K

Titolo

The vulnerability thesis [[electronic resource] ] : interest group influence and institutional design / / Lorelei K. Moosbrugger

Pubbl/distr/stampa

New Haven, : Yale University Press, c2012

ISBN

1-280-77053-8

9786613681300

0-300-16758-X

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (288 p.)

Disciplina

322.4/3

Soggetti

Majorities

Pressure groups

Representative government and representation

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Nota di contenuto

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- 1. Interest Group Influence And Institutional Design -- 2. The Vulnerability Thesis -- 3. Evidence From The Environment -- 4. The European Union -- 5. The United Kingdom: Minority Influence And Majority Rule -- 6. Germany: The Politics Of Paying The Polluter -- 7. Austria: Political Cover And Policy Choice -- 8. Sweden: Minority Representation And The Majority Interest -- 9. Institutional Design And The Quality Of Democracy -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index

Sommario/riassunto

Where politics is dominated by two large parties, as in the United States, politicians should be relatively immune to the influence of small groups. Yet narrow interest groups often win private benefits against majority preferences and at great public expense. Why? The "vulnerability thesis" is that the electoral system is largely to blame, making politicians in two-party systems more vulnerable to interest group demands than politicians in multiparty systems. Political scientist Lorelei Moosbrugger ranks democracies on a continuum of political vulnerability and tests the thesis by examining agrochemical policy in Austria, Britain, Germany, Sweden, and the European Union.