1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910778960003321

Autore

Goemans H. E (Hein Erich), <1957->

Titolo

War and punishment [[electronic resource] ] : the causes of war termination and the First World War / / H.E. Goemans

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Princeton, N.J., : Princeton University Press, c2000

ISBN

1-4008-1611-4

1-4008-1429-4

1-283-38012-9

9786613380128

1-4008-2395-1

Edizione

[Core Textbook]

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (366 p.)

Collana

Princeton studies in international history and politics

Disciplina

940.4/39

Soggetti

Peace

World War, 1914-1918 - Armistices

Peace treaties

Capitulations, Military

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

Description based upon print version of record.

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references (p. [325]-350) and index.

Nota di contenuto

Frontmatter -- CONTENTS -- LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES -- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- 1. INTRODUCTION -- 2. A THEORY OF WAR TERMINATION -- 3. LARGE N: THE FATE OF LEADERS AND THE DURATION OF WAR -- 4. GERMANY -- 5. RUSSIA -- 6. FRANCE -- 7. GREAT BRITAIN -- 8. THE TERMINATION OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR, I: 1914-1917 -- 9. THE TERMINATION OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR, II: 1918 -- 10. CONCLUSION -- BIBLIOGRAPHY -- INDEX

Sommario/riassunto

What makes wars drag on and why do they end when they do? Here H. E. Goemans brings theoretical rigor and empirical depth to a long-standing question of securities studies. He explores how various government leaders assess the cost of war in terms of domestic politics and their own postwar fates. Goemans first develops the argument that two sides will wage war until both gain sufficient knowledge of the other's strengths and weaknesses so as to agree on the probable outcome of continued war. Yet the incentives that motivate leaders to then terminate war, Goemans maintains, can vary greatly depending on



the type of government they represent. The author looks at democracies, dictatorships, and mixed regimes and compares the willingness among leaders to back out of wars or risk the costs of continued warfare. Democracies, according to Goemans, will prefer to withdraw quickly from a war they are not winning in order to appease the populace. Autocracies will do likewise so as not to be overthrown by their internal enemies. Mixed regimes, which are made up of several competing groups and which exclude a substantial proportion of the people from access to power, will likely see little risk in continuing a losing war in the hope of turning the tide. Goemans explores the conditions and the reasoning behind this "gamble for resurrection" as well as other strategies, using rational choice theory, statistical analysis, and detailed case studies of Germany, Britain, France, and Russia during World War I. In so doing, he offers a new perspective of the Great War that integrates domestic politics, international politics, and battlefield developments.